On the Intergenerational Transmission of Economic Status

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Abstract

We present a model in which human capital investments occur over the life-cycle and across generations, à la Becker and Tomes (1986), also featuring incomplete markets and government transfer programs. The human capital technology features multiple stages of investment during childhood, a college decision, and on-the-job accumulation. The model can jointly explain a wide range of intergenerational relationships, such as the intergenerational elasticities (IGE) of lifetime earnings, college attainment and wealth, while remaining empirically consistent with cross-sectional inequality. Much of life-cycle inequality is determined early in life, which in turn is explained in large part by parental background. The model implies that this is mainly due to early investments in children made by young parents, so life-cycle constraints these parents face are important for understanding the persistence of economic status across generations. Education subsidies, especially early on, can significantly reduce the intergenerational persistence of economic status.

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1. Introduction

The intergenerational elasticity or correlation (IGE/IGC) of earnings is as high as 0.4 in the U.S.. Wealth, consumption, schooling and poverty are also persistent across generations.1 Understanding this degree of persistence and disentangling the respective contributions of the transmission of innate abilities, family background, or economic policy has been the subject of much discussion and debate. However, most such analyses are statistical models, and economic models as of yet have come short of rationalizing various patterns we see in the data. The goal of this paper is to provide a framework to better understand such complex empirical relationships, and to analyze the impact of various policies.

Theories of intergenerational persistence gained traction beginning with the seminal work of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) (henceforth BT).2 They laid out a simple two-period equilibrium model and derived implications for the intergenerational transmission of lifetime earnings and wealth.3 But while the BT framework is used widely in the literature, it has been met with some empirical skepticism. Goldberger (1989) argued that an economic approach added little value relative to mechanical approaches that do not rely on optimizing behavior. Mulligan (1999) showed that the inability of a parent to borrow against the future income of his child (hereafter “intergenerational borrowing constraint”), a key feature of Becker and Tomes (1986), seems not to matter, and/or is empirically irrelevant. Han and Mulligan (2001) further argue that heterogeneous abilities and intergenerational borrowing constraints are indistinguishable.

One reason for this apparent invalidation of the BT model is that entire lifetimes are condensed into two periods, each of which comprises as many as 20-30 years. Parents make a once-and-for-all investment in children who grow up to earn a once-and-for-all income. Human and physical capital investments (intergenerational financial transfers) are decided simultaneously. The only moments predicted by the model are total investments in children’s education, lifetime earnings and total financial transfers, which are averaged over extensive time periods. Decisions made over multiple periods are ignored, which could affect intergenerational transfer decisions that happen much later in life, such as bequests. There is no consideration for less than perfectly substitutable child investments across periods.4 Furthermore, data spanning the entire lifetimes of multiple generations are scant at best, making it difficult to validate the key mechanisms of the model.

We explicitly incorporate multi-period decisions into the BT model. Adults accumulate human capital until retirement according to a Ben-Porath (1967) technology, as in Heckman, 1There is a large empirical literature that attempts to measure the magnitude of the IGE/IGC of earnings and/or income, and the number we cite is in the range of by now widely accepted value found by Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez (2014) using social security records, which in turn is similar to earlier estimates Solon (1992) using the PSID. Throughout the text, we will refer to the intergenerational persistence of earnings as simply “the IGE” unless clarification is needed.
2Loury (1981) was a similar model in a dynastic setting with borrowing constraints.
3There are several other important papers in the theoretical literature that focus on intergenerational persistence. Benabou (1993) and Durlauf (1996) present models of segregation, Galor and Zeira (1993) focus on poverty traps while Banerjee and Newman (1993) present a model featuring mobility traps.
4This criticism also forms part of the bases for studies such as Cunha and Heckman (2007); Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010); Caucutt and Lochner (2012) who argue that there is strong complementarity across periods.
Lochner, and Taber (1998); Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011) and others. When young, they educate their children over multiple periods according to a technology that features dynamic complementarity, and also face life-cycle borrowing constraints (Heckman and Mosso, 2014). Children grow up and go to college, and have their own children as they continue to accumulate their own human capital in adulthood. Financial transfers from one generation to the next occur only after children become fully grown adults. These families are cast in an overlapping generations framework in which learning abilities are imperfectly transmitted over generations, with infinitely-lived dynasties who are altruistic.\footnote{\textsuperscript{5}BT as well as many of the ensuing papers used two period models in which parents care about their own consumption and the income of their children. Assuming that parents care directly about descendants' utility allows a parsimonious representation of preferences, although is more costly numerically.}

We require this model to be consistent with intergenerational moments of earnings, education and wealth, and also cross-sectional earnings inequality over the life-cycle. While we are not the first to present a quantitative model, prior formulations were not directly comparable with available data: some assume away important features emphasized by BT, while others ignore the empirical skepticism raised against it.

Consistent with previous studies, our model predicts that most of life-cycle inequality is predetermined upon labor market entry (73-74%). What is new in our paper is that we can also quantify how much of this can be explained by parental background. We find that parents’ states when children are young can explain about a quarter of children’s life-cycle earnings variance later in life, and half of their lifetime wealth variance. This is because parents’ states have a large explanatory power over children’s initial conditions at age 24, and more so for wealth than earnings. Life-cycle borrowing constraints which prevent young parents from investing in their children early on is crucial for this result. Due to complementarity, suboptimal investments early in life cannot be corrected later in life. Hence the intergenerational borrowing constraint, faced by parents much later in life, does not matter much for young parents’ investments in children’s human capital. In our model, parents who are unable to invest enough in their children may instead invest in their own human capital, making it possible for parents who did not achieve optimal investment in their children’s human capital to make larger financial transfers.

Our model admits an IGC of lifetime earnings of 0.34 (Chetty et al., 2014) from an IGC of learning abilities of 0.23. Borrowing constraints faced by young parents who need to invest in their children’s human capital amplify ability persistence, accounting for about a third of earnings persistence. What distinguishes our model from previous BT-type models is that ours is an inherently non-linear model which differentiates ability persistence from childhood investments that happen across multiple stages of life (Heckman, 2008).

Conversely, the intergenerational component of the model also helps explain life-cycle inequality. Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003) demonstrate that accounting for intergenerational relationships is crucial to account for cross-sectional inequality, but take both the life-cycle earnings process and intergenerational relationships as exogenous. Huggett et al. (2011) estimate the joint distribution of human capital and assets at age 20 to match life-cycle earnings dynamics and distributions later in life. They find that small differences in initial conditions can lead to large differences in earnings and wealth over the life-cycle. In contrast, we take neither the earnings process nor initial conditions as given, and require
the intergenerational mechanism of our model to endogenously generate empirically valid distributions of earnings and wealth within and across generations. So the life-cycle component of our model helps explain intergenerational data, while intergenerational investments help explain cross-sectional data.

Ours is one of the first attempts at incorporating an endogenous human capital accumulation process into an intergenerational setting in which pre-labor market initial conditions are determined by multiple stages of childhood investments. Adding to the complexity is the asset and labor market equilibrium for college and non-college workers. These features are well understood in isolation, and parameters we recover are in the range of previous estimates. Following Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014), our childhood human capital production function also features both time and good investments. We estimate this production function using time-use, education expenses, and test score data from the Child Development Supplement (CDS) of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).6

After childhood but before entering the labor market, we assume households decide whether or not children enroll in college, as much of inequality can be attributed to differences in educational attainment. The college choice also allows us to separate cross-sectional inequality into differential skill prices and different levels of skill, a focus of many recent studies. Consistent with Carneiro and Heckman (2002); Carneiro, Heckman, and Vylacil (2011), college is mostly selection and explains little of life-cycle inequality. The Ben-Porath function for post-schooling life-cycle wage growth is calibrated to life-cycle earnings moments from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and its estimated parameter is in the range of estimates in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).

In addition to borrowing constraints, we also model various forms of government intervention. Thus, while our main objective is to rationalize intergenerational persistence and life-cycle inequality simultaneously, it is also suitable for counterfactual policy analyses. We find that relaxing the intergenerational borrowing constraint has only small effects. Relaxing the life-cycle constraint has a large impact on intergenerational persistence, reducing the IGC from 0.34 to 0.24, while also reducing inequality. When both constraints are relaxed simultaneously, the drop in the IGC is smaller but there is a further reduction in inequality and also a rise in average earnings. Among the policies we consider, we find that shifting all education subsidies to the earliest period, when children are ages 0-5, has the largest effect on long-run intergenerational persistence, reducing the IGC to as low as 0.1. This is because small differences early on generate large differences later in life, and young parents are the most likely to be borrowing constrained. Furthermore, such a policy also raises average earnings by increasing the average human capital level of the entire economy.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our model, and Section 3 describes the data we use to estimate key parameters, and empirical moments used to discipline the rest of the model parameters. Section 4 explains the calibration strategy. Sections 5-6 show our main results on sources of inequality and how our model differs from BT. Section 7 conducts counterfactuals in which we vary the tightness of borrowing constraints, tax progressivity, and education subsidies. Section 8 concludes.

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6As a caveat, we should emphasize that we do not use test scores to measure learning ability, which determines the slope of human capital growth, but rather the level of human capital among children.
2. Model

Time is discrete and one period is 6 years. At any given point in time, there are 13 overlapping generations, each with a unit mass of individuals (so the demographic structure is uniform). Each individual goes through 13 stages in life, and we let period $j$ represent the stage of the life-cycle between ages $[6j, 6j + 5]$. For the remainder of the text, we will denote all child variables with primes. The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 1.

Since a generation is 30 years, the child of a parent who is in period $j$ is always in period $j' = j - 5$. In periods $j = 5, 6, 7, 8$, we assume that the parent-child pair solves a Pareto problem to maximize period utility:

$$U(C_j) = \max \{ u(c_j) + \theta u(c_{j-5}') \}$$

where $C_j$ is the total consumption of the parent-child pair and $\theta$ the (dynastic) altruism factor. Assuming CRRA utility with coefficient $\chi$, we can write

$$U(C_j) = qu(C_j), \quad q = \left(1 + \theta \frac{1}{\chi}\right)^{\chi}$$

where $q$ is then interpreted as an adult consumption-equivalent scale.

2.1 Adulthood human capital accumulation

From college ($j = 3$) onward, we assume that human capital $h$ evolves as Ben-Porath:

$$h_{j+1} = \epsilon_{j+1} \left[ a(n_j h_j)^b + h_j \right], \quad (1)$$

where $a$ is an individual’s learning ability determined at birth, and $\epsilon_j$ is a market luck shock drawn in period $j$. It assumes the same exponent, $b$, for both the time spent accumulating human capital $n_j \in [0, 1]$ and human capital $h_j$. Shocks to the growth rate of human capital are manifested as permanent earnings shocks. We assume these market luck shocks are i.i.d. starting from a young adult’s first period of independence:

$$\log \epsilon_j \overset{i.i.d.}{\sim} N(\mu_\epsilon, \sigma^2_\epsilon) \equiv F(\epsilon), \quad j \in \{4, \ldots, 10\} \quad (2)$$

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$^7$This specification was used in Huggett et al. (2011), making our results easily comparable to theirs. We tried letting $b$ differ between high school and college, but they were calibrated to be virtually equal Heckman (1976); Heckman et al. (1998); Browning et al. (1999) all find evidence for a single exponent.

$^8$We have tried a version in which the initial shock is correlated with own ability or parental states, with zero to little impact on our quantitative results (the correlation was calibrated to be close to zero).
where \( \mu_a \) and \( \sigma_a \) are the population mean and standard deviation of abilities.

### 2.2 Childhood skill formation

At \( j = 5 \), individuals bear children whose abilities \( a' \) are drawn according to \( a' \sim G(a'|a) \), which we model as an AR(1) process

\[
\log a' = (1 - \rho_a)(\mu_a - \sigma_a^2/2) + \rho_a \log a + \eta', \quad \eta \sim N(0, (1 - \rho_a^2)\sigma_a^2),
\]

where \( \eta' \) is an intergenerational shock. Ability is constant throughout an individual’s lifetime, capturing intergenerational persistence not explained by economic behavior.

Next we include three important features of children’s skill formation that are well appreciated in the literature: i) parental time and good investments, ii) complementarity between inputs, and iii) multiple stages of investment. The amount of human capital a child attains at the beginning of \( j = 3 \) (college) is determined by

\[
h_{3}' = \zeta \left\{ \omega_2 X_{2}^{\phi_2} + (1 - \omega_2) \left[ \omega_1 X_{1}^{\phi_1} + (1 - \omega_1) \left( \omega_0 X_{0}^{\phi_0} \right)^{\phi_1} \right]^{\phi_2} \right\}^{\frac{1}{\phi_2}}
\]

where \( \phi_0 \) captures the returns to initial investments, and \( (\omega_{j'}, \phi_{j'}) \), \( j' \in \{1, 2\} \), capture the relative weights and complementarity between investments in periods \( j' - 1 \) and \( j' \). The input \( X_{j'} \) is a composite of parental time and good investments which we define below.

The constant \( \zeta \) is an anchor that transforms children’s human capital, which we will later proxy by test scores in the data, into adult outcomes, which we will measure using earnings (Cunha et al., 2010; Del Boca et al., 2014). Specifically, define \( \tilde{h}_{j'} \equiv h_{j'}/\zeta \) as pre-labor market skills in periods \( j' \in \{0, 1, 2\} \). Since the production function is HD1, we can write the childhood skill formation process recursively as

\[
\tilde{h}_1 \equiv \omega_0 X_{0}^{\phi_0}, \quad \tilde{h}_{j'+1} = \left[ \omega_{j'} X_{j'}^{\phi_{j'}} + (1 - \omega_{j'})\tilde{h}_{j'}^{\phi_{j'}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\phi_{j'}}}, \quad j' = 1, 2,
\]

which makes it explicit that one’s future earnings is a function of skills formed in childhood. This technology displays dynamic complementarity and self-productivity across multiple stages (Heckman and Mosso, 2014) and has been investigated in several recent papers (Cunha et al., 2010; Caucutt and Lochner, 2012).

The investment \( X_{j'} \) includes both time and good investments:

\[
X_{j'} \equiv (l_{j'}h_j + \gamma_{j'}d_{j'}/w_s)^{\gamma_{j'}} \left( m_{j'} + (1 - \gamma_{j'})d_{j'} \right)^{1 - \gamma_{j'}}.
\]

The inputs \( (l_{j'}, m_{j'}) \) are time and good investments in period \( j' \) made by a parent with human capital \( h_j \), and \( d_{j'} \) are government expenditures spent in education. This specification implies

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9In practice, the exact interpretation is slightly different, mainly because it is not separately identified from \( \omega_0 \). In our context, in addition to transforming test scores into meaningful units, \( \zeta \) will also capture the productivity of initial investments.

10Most previous work focus only on goods investments. Del Boca et al. (2014) focus only on time, and assume unit elasticities across periods. It turns out that the estimated elasticities across periods are close to one in our specification as well.
that higher human capital parents spend more time with their children, a salient feature of the data (Behrman, Foster, Rosenzweig, and Vashishtha, 1999).

Government expenditures are equally distributed across children and taken as given by all parents. Such expenditures are used as both time and good inputs (e.g., teachers and textbooks, respectively). For lack of a better alternative, the above specification assumes that public investments are split between time and good investments in the same ratio as private parental inputs; the time expenditure component of \(d_{j'}\) is divided by the parent’s wage, \(w_S\), to be transformed into parental time units. Specifically, let \(I_{j'}\) denote the total investment in a child of age \(j'\):

\[
I_{j'} = w_S h_{j'} l_{j'} + m_{j'} + d_{j'},
\]

then simple cost minimization implies that \(w_S h_{j'} l_{j'}/m_{j'} = \gamma_{j'}/(1 - \gamma_{j'})\) and

\[
X_{j'} = \lambda_{j'} I_{j'}, \quad \text{where} \quad \lambda_{j'} = (\gamma_{j'}/w_S)^{\gamma_{j'}}(1 - \gamma_{j'})^{1-\gamma_{j'}}
\]

is the implied productivity of one additional dollar of investment.\(^{11}\)

Technology (4) will capture the significance of parental inputs, as opposed to \(\rho_a\), the persistence of abilities. The parametric restrictions chosen are selected parsimoniously so that they can be recovered from the available data, which we discuss later.\(^{12}\)

### 2.3 Recursive formulation of decisions

Each period, choices are subject to the human capital production technologies in (1) and (5), which we suppress in the following formulations. Individuals in the working phase of the life-cycle are subject to the market luck shock (2), which are suppressed in the integral over tomorrow’s continuation value. In all periods \(j\), we assume that the individual can only borrow up to the amount that will be 100% repayable using the government transfer in the next period. So the borrowing constraint can be written

\[
s_{j+1} \geq -g/(1 + r),
\]

where \(r\) is the period interest rate and \(g\) a lump-sum subsidy.

**Period \(j = 4\): Independence**  The newly independent adult solves a standard life-cycle savings problem:

\[
V_4(S, a, h_4, s_4) = \max_{c_4, s_5, n_4} \left\{ u(c_4) + \beta \int V_5(a'; S, a, h_5, s_5)dF(\epsilon_5)dG(a'|a) \right\}
\]

\[
\text{s.t.} \quad c_4 + s_5 = f_4(e_4, 0) + s_4, \quad e_4 = w_S h_4(1 - n_4), \quad n_4 \in [0, 1]
\]

\(^{11}\)Our specification implies that private and public education expenditures are perfect substitutes. Assuming that they are not, as in (Heckman and Mosso, 2014), would be unidentified in our model in which subsidies apply equally to all individuals.

\(^{12}\)We could let children’s skill accumulation explicitly depend on the child’s ability, \(a'\), in which case parents with high \(a'\) children will anticipate this and invest more early on. But in Lee, Seshadri, and Roys (2015), we find that the estimated direct effect of one’s \(a'\) on childhood human capital is quantitatively negligible.
and the borrowing constraint (8). The first state $S$ denotes whether the individual is high-school or college educated ($S = 0$ or 1, respectively), $a$ the ability of the individual, and $h_4$ his level of human capital determined in the previous period. The last state, $s_4$, is a financial transfer from the parent that the young adult takes as given.

The function $f_j(e, s)$ denotes income net of a government tax-transfer program, that takes earnings and savings as inputs and is specified below.\(^{13}\) The variable $e_4$ captures the earnings of the adult. In addition to time spent accumulating his own human capital, $n_4$, the individual makes consumption-savings decisions ($c_4, s_5$). In addition to the i.i.d. luck shock to his own human capital, expectations are taken over the ability of the child the individual knows will be born tomorrow.

**Periods $j = 5, 6, 7$: Investment in children** During this stage, the parent (or family) faces the budget constraint

$$C_j + s_{j+1} = f_j(e_j, s_j) + s_j, \quad e_j = w_s h_j(1 - n_j - l_j') - m_j', \quad n_j \in [0, 1], \quad l_j' \in [0, n_j]$$

and the borrowing constraint (8). We assume that investment in children are deducted from parents’ income subject to the government tax-transfer program.\(^{14}\) In period 5, the parent takes care of his new-born child:

$$V_5(a'; S, a, h_5, s_5) = \max_{C_5, s_6, n_5, l_0, m_0} \left\{ qu(C_5) + \beta \int V_6(a', h_1'; S, a, h_6, s_6) dF(\epsilon_6) \right\} \tag{10}$$

where the child’s ability is now included in the parent’s state. The parent’s own human capital and savings $(h_5, s_5)$ are determined from yesterday’s optimal choices, while the latter is also affected by the market luck shock.

When the child goes to primary school in period 6, his human capital accumulated in period 5 appears as an additional state in the parent’s period 6 value function:

$$V_6(a', h_1'; S, a, h_6, s_6) = \max_{C_6, s_7, n_6, l_1, m_1} \left\{ qu(C_6) + \beta \int V_7(a', h_2'; S, a, h_7, s_7) dF(\epsilon_7) \right\}.$$ 

In period 7 the child goes to high school, after which he first becomes eligible for work. Between periods 7 and 8, childhood skills are transformed into adulthood human capital, so next period’s continuation value now includes $h'_3$ rather than $h'_2$:

$$V_7(a', h_2'; S, a, h_7, s_7) = \max_{C_7, s_8, n_7, l_2, m_2} \left\{ qu(C_7) + \beta \int V_8(a', h_3'; S, a, h_8, s_8) dF(\epsilon_8) \right\}.$$ 

\(^{13}\text{For the young adult, since } s_4 \text{ represents financial transfers that are made within period and not own savings from last period, it is not subject to the tax-transfer program. Parents would have already paid taxes on them before giving it to their children.}\)

\(^{14}\text{In reality, childcare in the U.S. is deductible, so this assumption is not necessarily stringent. Moreover, although later education expenses are not deductible, the amount deducted in the model is quantitatively negligible. This is because the majority of primary/secondary school expenses are paid for by the subsidies.}\)
Period $j = 8$: Child in college  The parent-child pair make a college decision:

$$V_8(a', h'_3; S, a, h_8, s_8) = \max_{s'} \{ W_8(S', a', h'_3; S, a, h_8, s_8) + \psi_S \cdot S' \}$$

where $S' = 1$ if the child goes to college and 0 otherwise. Hence $\psi_S$ is a preference for college that depends on whether or not the parent went to college herself, $S \in \{0, 1\}$. Once the decision is made, the child’s education status becomes a new state:

$$W_8(S', a', h'_3; S, a, h_8, s_8)$$

$$= \max_{c_8, s_9, h_9, n'_3} \left\{ qu(C_8) + \beta \int V_9(S', a', h'_4; S, a, h_9, s_9) dF(\epsilon_9) d\tilde{F}(\epsilon'_4 | a') \right\}$$

s.t. $C_8 + s_9 + \kappa S' = f(e_8, s_8) + f(e'_3, 0) + s_8$,

$$e_8 = w_S h_8(1 - n_8), \quad e'_3 = w_S h'_3(1 - n'_3), \quad n_8 \in [0, 1], \quad n'_3 \in [\tilde{\kappa} S', 1],$$

and the borrowing constraint (8). The constant $\kappa$ is the pecuniary cost of college, and children who go to college must spend at least 4 years accumulating human capital (rather than working), represented by $\tilde{\kappa} = 2/3$. Earnings of college-aged children are taxed independently, but children are assumed to have zero savings.

Period $j = 9$: Financial Transfers (Inter-vivos)  Now the child is an independent adult, and the parent makes a financial transfer $s'_4$:

$$V_9(S', a', h'_4; S, a, h_9, s_9)$$

$$= \max_{c_9, s_{10}, h_{10}, s'_4} \left\{ u(c_9) + \theta V_4(S', a', h'_4, s'_4) + \beta \int V_{10}(S, a, h_{10}) dF(\epsilon_{10}) \right\}$$

s.t. $c_9 + s_{10} + s'_4 = f(e_9, s_9) + s_9, \quad e_9 = w_S h_9(1 - n_9), \quad s'_4 \geq 0$. (11)

The intergenerational transfer $s'_4$ is subject to a non-negativity constraint, meaning that parents cannot borrow against their children’s future incomes, while $s_{10}$ is still subject to the life-cycle borrowing constraint (8). We assume that the parent makes the transfer after observing $\epsilon'_4$, but before the child makes any decisions. So the child takes the transfers as given when making his own decisions for the first time.

Period $j = 10, 11, 12$: Old Age and Retirement  The parent expects to be retired in periods $j = 11, 12$ during which he lives off social security benefits, so no longer faces any uncertainty in period 10. Furthermore, the choice for $n_{10} = 1$, since human capital becomes useless after retirement, hence:

$$V_{10}(S, h_{10}, s_{10}) = \max_{c_{10}, s_{11}} \left\{ u(c_{10}) + \beta u(c_{11}) + \beta^2 u(c_{12}) \right\}$$

s.t. $\sum_{j=10}^{12} \frac{c_j}{(1 + \tilde{r})^{j-10}} = f(e_{10}, s_{10}) + s_{10} + \frac{2 + \tilde{r}}{(1 + \tilde{r})^2} \cdot (p_0 + p_1 e_{10} + g)$,

$$e_{10} = w_S h_{10}$$

\footnote{We have also let $\psi$ depend on $a_k$, but once $S$ was included the impact of $a_k$ was calibrated to be zero.}
where we assume that after retirement, financial income is taxed at a flat rate, resulting in an after-tax effective interest rate of $\tilde{r}$. The parameters $(p_0, p_1)$ capture the social security scheme, which is affine in an individual’s last period earnings, and $g$ is a lump-sum government subsidy. This implies that savings in periods 10 and 11 are

$$s_{11} = f(e_{10}, s_{10}) + s_{10} - c_{10}, \quad s_{12} = (1 + \tilde{r})s_{11} + p_0 + p_1e_{10} + g - c_{11}.$$

### 2.4 Government, production and equilibrium

All income is taxed progressively, and earnings are subject to a social security tax $\tau_s$. Given earnings and assets $(e_j, s_j)$ in period $j$, after-tax income is

$$f_j(e_j, s_j) = [1 - \tau_y(y_j)]y_j + (1 - \tau_s)e_j + q_j \cdot g, \quad y_j \equiv e_j + rs_j$$

where $\tau_y(\cdot)$ is a progressive tax schedule, $y_j$ is period income, and the period interest rate $r = (1 + \tilde{r})^6 - 1$, where $\tilde{r}$ is the annual interest rate. The lump-sum subsidy $g$ is meant to capture welfare transfers, and $q_j$ is an adult equivalent scale equal to 1 in periods 4, 8, ... , 12 (adults with no children in the household); $q_j$ in periods 5, 6, 7 (households with children); and 2 in period 8 (child is college-age). The constant $\tau_s$ is a flat-rate social security tax. The revenue is used to finance a PAYGO social security scheme received by retirees (parametrized by $(p_0, p_1)$ above). As stated in the previous subsection, retirees do not face the progressive income tax, but instead pay a flat rate $\tilde{\tau}_k$ on their interest income from savings (which is their only source of income).

A representative firm uses physical capital, and high school and college human capital to produce the single consumption good. It solves

$$\max_{K, H_0, H_1} \{ F(K, H_0, H_1) - RK - w_0H_0 - w_1H_1 \}$$

where $K$ is aggregate capital and $(H_0, H_1)$ are aggregate quantities of utilized human capital in efficiency units for high school and college labor, which are imperfect substitutes:

$$F(K, H_0, H_1) = K^\alpha(AH)^{1-\alpha}, \quad H \equiv [vH_0^\alpha + (1 - v)H_1^\alpha]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}.$$

The price of capital $R = (1 + \tilde{r} + \delta)^6 - 1$ where $\delta$ the annual depreciation rate of capital. The firm’s profit maximization leads to the optimality conditions

$$RK = \alpha Y, \quad WH = (1 - \alpha)Y, \quad \frac{w_1}{w_0} = \frac{1 - v}{v} \left( \frac{H_1}{H_0} \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}}$$

where $W$ is an aggregate wage index for $H$:

$$W = \left[ v^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}w_0^{\frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma}}} + (1 - v)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}w_1^{\frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma}}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}}.$$

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16Although college-age children are still assumed to make joint decisions with their parents, they are treated as adults in terms of taxation and transfers.

17The TFP parameter $A$ is not qualitatively important in our stationary setting, but later calibrated so that average earnings equals 1.
Now let \( z_j \) denote the state space of an adult in period \( j \), \( z \equiv [z_4, \ldots, z_{12}] \) the aggregate state space spanning all generations, and \( \Phi(z) \) its stationary distribution. Let \( \bar{e} \) denote the average earnings in the economy:

\[
\bar{e} = \frac{\int_S \left[ e_3(z_8) + \sum_{j=4}^{10} e_j(z_j) \right] d\Phi(z)}{8},
\]

since at any point in time, there are 8 generations that are working and we assume a uniform demographic structure. To define a stationary equilibrium, let \( \Gamma(\cdot) \) denote the aggregate law of motion of \( z \), which is derived from the agents’ policy functions.

**Definition 1** In a stationary equilibrium, prices \((r, w_0, w_1)\) and decision rules are such that

1. Given prices, agents of all ages make optimal choices;
2. The representative firm maximizes profit;
3. Capital and labor markets clear:
   \[
   K = \int \left[ \sum_{j=5}^{12} s_{j+1}(z_j) \right] d\Phi(z), \quad w_S H_S = \int_S \left[ e_3(z_8) + \sum_{j=4}^{10} e_j(z_j) \right] d\Phi(z),
   \]
   which implies that the goods market clears;
4. The social security budget balances:
   \[
   2 \left( p_0 + p_1 \int e_{10}(z_{10}) d\Phi(z) \right) = 8\tau_s \bar{e}
   \]
5. The distribution of \( z \) is stationary: \( \Phi(z) = \int \Gamma(z) d\Phi(z) \).

### 3. Data

Some of the model parameters are estimated from the PSID and the CDS. The data is also used to generate target moments for other parameters that are separately calibrated. The adulthood part of the model is disciplined using the earnings of heads of households in the PSID 1969-2007 family files, and the childhood part using the CDS and its Time Diary data files, which has three waves: 1997, 2002 and 2007.

### 3.1 Life-cycle Earnings

The PSID collects data on a representative sample of more than 5,000 American families, oversampling low-income families. Importantly for our purposes, the data includes earnings (labor income) and annual hours information for each family member.

Our empirical analysis is similar to Huggett et al. (2011), but we also differentiate between high school and college, which is defined as whether an individual’s final education outcome
is at least one year beyond high school graduation (or GED).\footnote{This is the same criteria as in Heckman et al. (1998). Increasing the education categories would be interesting, but in the context of our model becomes numerically infeasible.} See Appendix A.1 for details on how we clean the data.

**Education Specific Age-Earnings Profiles** First, we construct target moments for our quantitative model. Let $E_{iat}$ denote the observed earnings of an individual $i$ of age $a$ at time $t$. We run the regression:\footnote{As well known, time and cohort effects are not separately identified; we use the time effects approach as the benchmark following Huggett et al. (2011).}

$$\log E_{iat} = S_a + A_a + T_t + S_a A_a + S_a T_t + \varepsilon_{iat}$$

where $(S_a, A_a, T_t)$ are education, age and time effects, respectively. We also include interaction terms to completely separate education-specific earnings profiles by $S_a$ (high school or college).\footnote{High school includes some-college workers.} We then compute the education-specific earnings profiles using the estimated coefficients as the average marginal treatment effect of each education-age category, assuming a balanced distribution for each education-age-time category.

Figures 2(a)-(b) depict the estimated profiles and residual log earnings variance (the variance of $\varepsilon_{iat}$ by $a$). The earnings profiles are normalized so that high school earnings at age 55 equals one. As is well known, earnings follows a hump-shape with a much steeper profile for college workers, and residual log earnings variance rises with age. In our quantitative analysis, we target all three profiles, averaged by 6-year bins.

**Earnings volatility** We use old age individuals in the PSID to compute the mean and variance of the market luck shocks, $(\mu_\epsilon, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$. In the Ben-Porath model, workers stop accumu-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>$\mu_\epsilon$</th>
<th>$\sigma_\epsilon$</th>
<th># Obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>712</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Earnings Volatility Parameters estimated from PSID

$\mu_\epsilon$ is recovered from the mean slope of old age individuals in Figure 2(a), and $\sigma_\epsilon$ from the variance of the residuals from regressing equation (18). Refer to text for details.

...危及人力资本，直到他们工作的最后两个时期 $j = 9, 10$. 如果代理人花费零时间投资于他们自己的人力资本，收入就成为市场工资率和收入冲击的函数：

$$\log e_{10} - \log e_9 = \log w_S h_{10} - \log w_S h_9 = \log \epsilon_{10}.$$  

由于 $\epsilon_j$ 假设是独立同分布的，跨个体和年龄，我们可以估计 $\epsilon_j$ 的均值和方差简单地通过查看样本均值和方差的年增长率为的旧工作者收入：

$$\hat{\mu}_\epsilon = \hat{E}[\log e_{10}] - \hat{E}[\log e_9], \quad \hat{\sigma}_\epsilon^2 = \hat{V}[\log e_{10}] - \hat{V}[\log e_9],$$  

(17)

其中 $\hat{E}$ 和 $\hat{V}$ 分别代表样本均值和方差操作符。我们分别计算这些统计量以供高中和大学使用。

在实践中，对于 $\mu_\epsilon$，我们简单地计算收入在图2(a)中结束的生命周期的平均斜率，分别针对高中和大学。对于 $\sigma_\epsilon^2$ 我们首先计算小时工资率的数据。然后我们使用5年移动平均值平滑年度小时工作，并计算每个观测点的工资率，$W_{iats}$，作为平滑收入除以平滑小时。由于一个模型时期是6年，我们需要保持所有年龄60至65的个体。对于这些个体，我们计算54至60，55至61，等等的年工资差。然后我们运行固定效应回归

$$d \log W_{iat} = u_i + S_s + A_a + T_t + S_s[A_a + T_t] + \epsilon_{iat},$$  

(18)

其中 $d \log W_{iat}$ 是6年的年工资差，以及在个体级别聚类标准误差。该过滤器给出了个体和时间固定的效应，以及每个6年距离对的不同的趋势。然后我们取残差的方差作为高中的 $\sigma_\epsilon^2$ 的估计。结果在表1中被列出来。冲击正在减少平均但更少的大学，而波动性更高于大学。22

### 3.2 Investment in children

1997年，2002年和2007年，PSID收集了对儿童和儿童结果的投资详细数据。初期波浪包含大约3,500个儿童和2,400个家庭。收集的信息范围包括年龄12和以下的家庭。初波浪的波浪数是3,500个儿童在2,400个家庭。信息收集的范围是

21 This is a common approach in models using Ben-Porath technologies.
22 which is based on 507 old individuals with 1,466×2 wage observations.
Figure 3: Opportunity cost of time investment in children

Source: PSID, Child Development Supplement Time Diaries. “Active” time is defined as when children report a parent participated in their activity, and “passive” time when they report a parent was around but not participating. Time costs are computed by multiplying parents’ weekly time spent with children by their annual wage rate (earnings/hours)×52. All values in 2000 USD.

large, of which we use three: the time diaries, private and public money expenditures for children, and children’s Letter-Word test scores. These are used to estimate the childhood skill formation technology (5). For the purposes of our study, we take a unit of observation as a child.23 For more details, refer to Appendix A.2

Time spent with children Each child in the CDS submitted a detailed 24-hour time diary for one weekday and one weekend-day.24 For each activity listed, children were also asked to list whether or not a parent (or another adult) was present, and if so, whether the parent was just around or participating in the given activity. Del Boca et al. (2014) refer to this as “active” and “passive” time, respectively. We follow their strategy in how to aggregate the data into weekly hours for these two sources. For each category, we also compute the parents’ opportunity time cost, using parents’ labor market information from the PSID. See Appendix A.2 for details.

In Figure 3(a), the sum of active and passive time shows a clear downward trend for moms, but the trend for dads appears to be flat. In Figure 3(b), which depicts parents’ opportunity costs in dollars, the active time cost is clearly declining with children’s age, but passive time costs are increasing. This is most likely due to dads spending more passive time with children as they age, who also tend to earn more than moms.

In the model, time spent with children comes at the expense of parents working or accumulating their own human capital. When parents are around but not participating, it could mean that parents are engaged in either activity at the same time rather than educating

23That is, we do not take into consideration that time and money expenses reported by a parent may be spent on more than one child.

24For younger children, the diary was filled by a caregiver.
their children. Furthermore, passive time is not only noisier but also estimated to have much lower productivity than active time in Del Boca et al. (2014). For all these reasons, we will use only active time costs as the measure of parental time inputs into children’s skill formation in our estimation below.

**Letter-Word test scores** To estimate the child skill formation technology (5), we need a measure of children’s outcomes \( \tilde{h} \). As is common in the literature, we use children’s test scores—specifically, the Letter-Word test score outcomes administered to all children in the CDS. The standard LW-test comprises 57 questions, and the CDS records whether the child answered each question correctly or not (1-0).

Since we want to capture children’s cognitive development as they age in addition to heterogeneity, we adjust the raw test score as follows. Let \( d_q \) denote the fraction of children who answer question \( q \) correctly, regardless of age. We then assume that question \( q \) is worth \( d_q \) points, and sum up across questions to obtain a child’s adjusted test score.

In Figure 4(a), both raw and adjusted test scores are normalized to lie between 0-100. The figure shows that test scores increase with age, flattening out at later ages. Adjusted scores are less steep than raw scores at earlier ages but as steep at later ages, resulting in a smoother average increase in scores over age. Strikingly, for the adjusted scores, the data shows that children’s test score variance increases with age, just as earnings variance increases with age.

---

25 Passive time could also be parents’ leisure time.

26 Clearly, this is a measure of children’s cognitive skills. While non-cognitive skills are also important inputs into adult outcomes, including multiple skills is beyond the scope of this paper. The CDS contains other test scores as well, but we use LW-scores as it is the only test administered to all children of all ages.

27 As shown in Figure 15 in Appendix E, higher number questions are designed to be much more difficult, with almost no children getting the last question correct.

28 Alternatively, we could run an age-time effects regression as we did for earnings. However, the LW-test is standardized so that each question is similar every year, so its difficulty progresses with question number but does not vary much across tests. Regardless, including time effects barely changes the data.
increases monotonically with adult’s age. This suggests that human capital differences across individuals begin at a much earlier age than college or labor market entry; Indeed, the variance increases monotonically already from age 2. We take these normalized, adjusted test scores as $\log h$ when we estimate technology (5) below.

**Childcare and educational money expenditures** For money investments in children, we focus only on expenditures related to children’s cognitive skills such as costs of childcare, money spent on schooling (this includes private school tuition and school-related supplies) and extracurricular activities (such as private tutoring and lessons). Unlike time and test score data, this data is extremely noisy in the CDS, so we only use average moments. For details, refer to Appendix A.2

Average private expenditures by age are shown in Figure 5. Although the data is noisy, its shows an increasing pattern for money expenditures as children grow older. At the same time, schooling costs, mostly in the form of private school tuition, crowds out other expenditures as children grow older.

For most children above schooling age, however, public schooling is the dominant source of money expenditures. For public schooling expenses, we refer to the 1997 CDS school administrator files. As shown in Figure 6, both daycare and schooling costs do not vary much over age, with discrete jumps when children begin kindergarten (grade 0 in Figure 6(b)) and high school (grade 9). But parents bear most of the cost burden for daycare, while they pay less than a few hundred dollars on average for schooling.

29Perhaps interestingly, the standard deviation of raw test scores displays a spike in early ages. This is likely because among very young children, some children mature earlier and begin to answer many easy questions correctly, while others lag behind. As children age, the variance declines as most of them get all the easy questions. When weighted by difficulty, questions that any child would answer correctly after a certain age becomes less important for the adjusted test score.

30Test scores for even younger children are unavailable; the values in Figure 4 are predicted values.)
3.3 Estimating children’s skill formation technology

Armed with information on parents’ time spent with children, children’s test scores, and private and public money expenditures, we recover the three important parameters of the childhood skill formation technology in (5), namely \((\phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2)\), the complementarity between different stages of child investments. The model assumes single parent, single child households. Since our unit of observation in the data was per child, we first normalize the active time investments in children by the number of parents. As shown in Figure 7(a), the average cost per parent is slightly above half of the average cost per child. About one-fifth of the sample are single parent households, of whom 95% are single moms.

Technologies (5)-(6) imply that the share of time and good investments satisfy

\[
\begin{align*}
 w_{j} & = \gamma_{j} (X_{j}/\lambda_{j} - d_{j}), \\
 m_{j} & = (1 - \gamma_{j}) (X_{j}/\lambda_{j} - d_{j}).
\end{align*}
\]

In the data, \(w_{j} \gamma_{j}\) corresponds to the opportunity cost of time spent with children, and \(m_{j}\) to money costs. For each age \(a\), we compute the ratio of mean time and money investments in children shown in Figures 5 and 7(a), and denote this value \(\tilde{\gamma}_{a}\). The values of \(\tilde{\gamma}_{a}\) are shown in the left axis of Figure 7(b), and as expected, the weight on time investments declines as children age, most of which happens when the child begins school.

Next, we fix the values of \(d_{j}\) using information from Figure 6. We assume that kindergarten is age 6 and grade 12 is age 18, and merge the institutional cost data for daycare centers and schools to construct a unified series for ages 0-17.\(^{31}\) For each age, we then subtract the average fees paid by parents from the average dollars spent per student, which we take as a dollar measure for public subsidies, denoted \(\tilde{d}_{a}.\(^{32}\) These are shown in the right axis of Figure 7(b) and is increasing with age, mostly when the child begins school.

---

\(^{31}\)While not shown in the figures, a small number of daycare centers provide pre-K and kindergarten education, and some schools provide pre-K education as well.

\(^{32}\)Private money expenses are largely comprised of private school tuition for older children, while the implied school fees paid by parents are small. We continue to include private schooling costs as shown in Figure 5, because we believe that most parents indeed do spend more money on their children at later ages,
Now let $T_{i,a}$ denote the implied time cost investment (the average opportunity cost of parents’ active time investment in children) observed in the data. Given the values of $(\tilde{\gamma}_a, \tilde{d}_a)$, implied total investment in child $i$ of age $a$ is $\tilde{I}_{i,a} = T_{i,a}/\tilde{\gamma}_a + \tilde{d}_a$. Since $\tilde{X}_{i,a} = \lambda_a \tilde{I}_{i,a}$ from (7), the (5) implies that between periods 0 and 1 (child ages 0-5 to 6-11)

$$\left(\frac{\tilde{h}_{i,a}}{\tilde{h}_{i,a-6}}\right)^{\phi_1} = \omega_1 \left(\frac{\tilde{X}_{i,a}}{\tilde{h}_{i,a-6}}\right)^{\phi_1} + 1 - \omega_1,$$

while cost minimization across periods implies

$$(1 + r)\tilde{I}_{i,a}/\tilde{I}_{i,a-6} = \left[\omega_1/(1 - \omega_1)\right] \cdot \left(\frac{\tilde{X}_{i,a}}{\tilde{h}_{i,a-6}}\right)^{\phi_1},$$

from which we obtain

$$\log \left[\frac{(1 + r)\tilde{I}_{i,a}}{\tilde{I}_{i,a-6}} + 1\right] = -\log(1 - \omega_1) + \phi_1 \left(\log \tilde{h}_{i,a} - \log \tilde{h}_{i,a-6}\right)$$

(19)

and similarly between ages 6-11 and 12-17 we obtain

$$\log \left[\frac{(1 + r)\tilde{I}_{i,a}}{\tilde{I}_{i,a-6} + \frac{\tilde{I}_{i,a-12}}{1+r}} + 1\right] = -\log(1 - \omega_2) + \phi_2 \left(\log \tilde{h}_{i,a} - \log \tilde{h}_{i,a-6}\right),$$

(20)

which is not reflected in other costs simply due to the lack of quality data. Moreover, our estimation strategy only exploits variation in time investments and is insensitive to the value of the $\gamma_{j’}$’s, although our later quantitative results potentially are.
where the denominator on the left-hand side is now the cost of human capital production spanning both periods \( a - 6 \) and \( a - 12 \). Assuming that \( r = 1.046 - 1 \), as we do in the calibration, the \( \Delta Y_{i,a} \)'s on the left-hand sides are observed in the data.

For the first period, children aged 0-5, we have from (5) and (7) that

\[
\log \tilde{h}_{i,a} = \log \omega_0 + \phi_0 \log \bar{X}_{i,a} = \log \omega_0 + \phi_0 \log \lambda_a + \phi_0 \log \tilde{I}_{i,a} \tag{21}
\]

Assuming childhood human capital \( \tilde{h}_{i,a} = b \exp(LW_{i,a}) \), where \( LW_{i,a} \) is the adjusted LW-score of child \( i \) of age \( a \), we can recover the three parameters (\( \phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2 \)) from

\[
Y_{i,a} = A_a + \phi_0 \tilde{I}_{i,a} + \epsilon_{i,a} \quad \text{for ages 0-5},
\]

\[
\Delta Y_{i,a} = B_j + \phi_j \Delta LW_{i,a} + \epsilon_{i,a} \quad \text{for period } j = 1, 2 \text{ and ages } 6j \text{ to } 6j + 5, \tag{22}
\]

where \( A_a \) is a complete set of age dummies for the first period, \( \Delta LW_{i,a} = LW_{i,a} - LW_{i,a-6} \), and \( B_j \) are regression constants.

Since test scores are only available for children age 2 and above, the sample size for estimating \( \phi_0 \) in (21) is rather small at 140. Similarly, to conduct regressions (22), we need to observe time investments and test scores for consecutive waves in the CDS. \(^{33}\) Consequently, the estimation of \( \phi_1 \) is also based on a small sample size of 101 due to additional data attrition. The sample size for estimating \( \phi_2 \) is 215, for which we need 3 consecutive observations of time investments, but only 2 for test scores. All estimates are tabulated in Table 2, and the \( \phi_j \)'s are visualized in Figures 16-17 in Appendix E.

While investments across periods are far from perfectly substitutable, as emphasized by Heckman and Mosso (2014), the estimates of \((\phi_1, \phi_2)\) are close to 0 with small standard errors. Moreover, the estimate for \( \phi_0 \) is equal to unity. Despite the limited sample size, since all estimates are tightly estimated, in our subsequent calibration we set the values of the \( \phi_j \)'s to \((1, 0, 0)\): that is, initial human capital is linear in inputs and the dynamic skill formation technology is Cobb-Douglas. \(^{34}\)

---

**Table 2: Parameters estimated from the CDS (3 waves)**

Estimates are recovered from an OLS regression of equations (19)-(20). Refer to text for details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>( \phi_0 )</th>
<th>( \phi_1 )</th>
<th>( \phi_2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>1.01***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Obs.</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{19}\)

\(^{33}\) Counting first period as period 0.

\(^{34}\) All estimates are tightly estimated, in our subsequent calibration we set the values of the \( \phi_j \)'s to \((1, 0, 0)\): that is, initial human capital is linear in inputs and the dynamic skill formation technology is Cobb-Douglas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\chi, \alpha, \delta$</td>
<td>1.5, 0.32, 0.07</td>
<td>previous literature ((\text{Browning et al., 1999; Huggett et al., 2011}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>skill elasticity 1.44 ((\text{Katz and Murphy, 1992; Heckman et al., 1998}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2$</td>
<td>0.90, 0.71, 0.68</td>
<td>Time investment in children’s skill formation ([\text{Figure 7(b)}])</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Set in equilibrium

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{\beta} = \beta^{1/6}$</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>interest rate 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu$</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>college enrollment rate 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>1.674</td>
<td>average earnings controller</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Fixed Parameters

4. Calibration

We now explain how we discipline the remaining parameters of the model.

4.1 Parameters Set Exogenously

Several parameters are fixed at standard values in the literature, while policy variables are set to their empirical counterparts. The rest are computed from a method of moments by numerically simulating the model. These parameters are summarized in Tables 3-7.

Preferences and technology The CRRA coefficient $\chi$ is fixed at 2. The capital income share $\alpha$ and depreciation rate of capital $\delta$ are set to $\langle 0.32, 0.07 \rangle$, which are consistent with long-run U.S. data.\(^{35}\) The elasticity parameter $\sigma$ is set to $\langle 1-1/1.44 \rangle$, which are estimated in Katz and Murphy (1992); Heckman et al. (1998) to aggregate time trends in labor supply.

The parameters that govern the time share of investments in children, $(\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2)$, are set to the mean values of their empirical counterparts $\tilde{\gamma}_a$ depicted in Figure 7(b), averaged over the corresponding age intervals of 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17.

Parameters set in equilibrium The discount factor $\beta$ is calibrated to an implied annual interest rate of $\bar{r} = 4\%$ in the benchmark equilibrium, consistent with historical data on long-run asset returns. Skill prices $(w_0, w_1)$ are not directly observed in the data, so we calibrate these prices jointly with $\nu$, the weight on high school human capital, so that the

\(^{33}\)Unfortunately, the CDS was conducted every 5 years while our model period is 6 years, but for lack of a better alternative we ignore this 1 year difference.

\(^{34}\)If we had set $\tilde{h} = b \exp(\tilde{h}^a)$, the parameter $a$ would not be separately identified from the $\phi_j$’s, which we estimate, and the $\omega_j$’s, which we calibrate. Hence, we have normalized it to 1. What is really striking about the estimate of $\phi_0$ is the strong evidence of linearity, not so much the slope itself. In the appendix, we check the robustness of our results to different values for $(\phi_1, \phi_2)$.

\(^{35}\)Huggett et al. (2011) uses these same values.
employment share of college workers and the college premium equal their long-run averages in equilibrium.\footnote{See Appendix B.1 for details.}

We also ensure that mean earnings, $\bar{\ell}$, is equal to 1 in our benchmark equilibrium. We do so by varying the level of TFP, $A$, which simply shifts wages uniformly for all individuals. This normalization is useful when setting the model’s policy parameters below, most of which are normalized by mean earnings.\footnote{Mean earnings in our PSID sample is 38,338 in 2000 U.S. dollars.}

### Tax-transfer system

We parametrize the progressive income tax function in (12) as

$$\tau(y) = \tau_0 + \tau_1 \log(y/\bar{y}),$$

where $\bar{y}$ is mean income, following Guner et al. (2014), and use their estimates for $(\tau_0, \tau_1)$. Mean savings $\bar{s}$ equals capital per worker in equilibrium, so using (14) we can write mean income as $\bar{y} = \bar{\ell} + r\bar{s} = \bar{\ell} (1 + \frac{R}{\bar{R}} \cdot \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha})$, which is a function of fixed parameters only.

We view the lump-sum transfer $g$ primarily as welfare payments for the poor, and set it to 3% of mean earnings. The size of welfare transfers in the U.S. was approximately 1-2% of total GDP throughout the late 1980s to mid-1990s, of which we take the upper-bound 2% and divide by $1 - \alpha$ to make it a fraction of mean earnings rather than GDP per worker.\footnote{We take the upper-bound since the model transfers are not means-tested while real-world welfare transfers, such as AFDC, are. Hence the transfers need to be larger to match the amount received by the poorest households.}

The adult equivalent scale, $q_A$, which increases transfers for families with children, is set to 1.7. This is the correction used by the OECD to compare the consumption of two-adult households with two-children against those without children.

Social security payments in the U.S. is based on the average of a retired individual’s highest 36 years of earnings. The replacement scheme is affine with kinks, with most individuals receiving a 32% return on their average earnings. Since the model system is based on last period earnings only, we adjust this factor and set $p_1 = 0.33$.\footnote{We assume that social security payments depend only on last period earnings to avoid numerical complexities. The adjustment is made according to mean age-earnings profiles in the PSID.} Given this, we choose $p_0$ and the payroll tax $\tau_S$ to balance the social security budget and match a replacement rate of 40% (Diamond and Gruber, 1999). Since all working adults pay social security taxes, this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_0, \tau_1$</td>
<td>0.10, 0.04</td>
<td>progressive income tax Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g$</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>welfare transfers 2% of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_A$</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>OECD adult equivalence scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_1$</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>median social security replacement bracket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_0, \tau_s$</td>
<td>0.08, 0.11</td>
<td>40% replacement rate (Diamond and Gruber, 1999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Government tax-transfer system parameters
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$d_0$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Public expenditures in children’s</td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d_1$</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>skill formation [Figure 7(b)]</td>
<td>3,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d_2$</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost of College ($)</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two-year public</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four-year public</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>4,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four-year private</td>
<td>7,170</td>
<td>19,046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Education subsidies and cost of college
Public expenditures and costs of college are in 2000 USD.

implies

$$p_0 + p_1 \bar{e}_{10} = 4 \tau_s \bar{e}, \quad p_0 + p_1 \bar{e}_{10} = 0.4 \bar{e}_{10},$$

where $\bar{e}_{10}$ is mean earnings from ages 60-65 and can be computed from the PSID. This results in $\tau_s = 0.11$ and $p_0 = 0.08 \bar{e}$. All policy parameters are summarized in Table 4.

**Education** Similarly as the time investment shares, public subsidies in children’s education $(d_0, d_1, d_2)$ are obtained from the mean dollar values of their empirical counterparts $\tilde{d}_a$ in Figure 7(b), averaged over the age intervals of 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17, then divided by mean earnings in the PSID. The exact values are summarized in Table 5.

We refer to *Trends in College Pricing*, published annually by the College Board, to construct the college cost parameter $\kappa$. We exclude room and board and only include tuition and fees, since all individuals incur living costs (through consumption) regardless of college attendance. Table 5 shows the average costs of attending a 2-year public, 4-year public, and 4-year private college in the two years 1980 and 2005. 2-year colleges are much cheaper than 4-year colleges, which are in turn substantially cheaper than private colleges. The table also shows that the cost of college has been rising over time: from 1980 to 2005, average costs more than doubled for all types of colleges. Since we do not differentiate between these types of colleges, we simply assume that the first two-years of college costs the average of all three types, and the latter two-years the average of 4-year public and private colleges. Then we take the mean of these two values, and divide it by mean earnings to obtain the model cost of college $\kappa$.

### 4.2 Method of Moments

The 10 remaining parameters are chosen to minimize the distance between 27 equilibrium moments simulated by the model and empirical moments from the PSID, CDS, and three intergenerational persistence moments we take from previous literature, summarized in Table 6. Specifically, the parameter vector is $\Theta = [\theta \; \rho_a \; \mu_a \; \sigma_a \; b \; \zeta \; \omega_1 \; \omega_2 \; \psi_1 \; \psi_2]'$, whose calibrated values are summarized in Table 7.
Altruism and the exogenous persistence of abilities, \((\theta, \rho_a)\), govern intergenerational persistence of wealth and earnings. Empirical estimates of the intergenerational persistence of earnings and income have been studied by Solon (1992); Chetty et al. (2014), among others. We follow the latter and target a rank-rank slope of 0.34 when regressing children’s lifetime average earnings on parents’. Consistently with that paper, we also find that there is no significant difference between the rank correlation and the intergenerational elasticity of earnings.

Intergenerational transfers as a share of an economy’s total net worth are usually estimated from the SCF, by transforming transfer flows into a stock of “transfer wealth” under a steady state assumption (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981). Although the exact estimate varies depending on the assumed demographic structure, Gale and Scholz (1994); Brown and Weisbenner (2004) obtain estimates in the range of 30% in the 1986 and 1998 SCF, respectively. While their transfers combine inter-vivos transfers and bequests, our model only includes a once-and-for-all transfer, \(s_4\). So we choose the ratio of \(s_4\) over total savings as the simulated moment.\(^{40}\)

The mean and variance of abilities, \((\mu_a, \sigma^2_a)\), along with the Ben-Porath parameter \(b\), govern the distribution of age-earnings profiles. These are calibrated to 21 moments from the PSID: the mean age-earnings profiles, the life-cycle profile of the college premium, and the residual earnings variance from age 24 to 65, which we compute from Figure 2 by averaging over 6 year brackets.

In Section 3.3, we estimated that the skill formation technology (5) is linear in the child’s first period of life and Cobb-Douglas across periods. The remaining parameters, \((\zeta, \omega_1, \omega_2)\), are calibrated to the means of parents’ fraction of (active) time spent with children in Figure 14(a), averaged over 6 year intervals.\(^{41}\) A parent with children aged 0-5 spends between 20-30 weekly hours actively, corresponding to about 16% of their time a week as shown in Table 2. This declines to about 8% when the child becomes 12-17.

The taste for college parameters, \((\psi_1, \psi_2)\), govern how many children go to college in

\(^{40}\)Specifically, the transfer wealth-net worth ratio \(\frac{\int s_4 d\Phi}{\int \sum_{j=5}^{12} s_j d\Phi} = 0.3\)

\(^{41}\)Note that \(\omega_0\) is not separately identified from these three parameters. While the \(\omega_j\)’s capture the productivity of each stage’s investment, \(\zeta\) boosts the productivity in all periods \(j' = 0, 1, 2\).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \theta )</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>Parental altruism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_a )</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Persistence of learning abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \mu_a )</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>Mean of learning abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma_a )</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>Variance of learning abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b )</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>Ben-Porath HC accumulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \zeta )</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>Child to adult human capital anchor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_1 )</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>Productivity of investment in children, primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega_2 )</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>Productivity of investment in children, secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \psi_1 )</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Preference for children going to college, high school parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \psi_2 )</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>Preference for children going to college, college parents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Calibrated Parameters

aggregate and how much it differs by parents’ education status. Hence we target \( L_1 = 0.45 \), the fraction of individuals who attain at least 1 year of college education in the PSID, and its persistence. For the latter, we refer to the NLSY97, according to which about 73% of high school graduates whose father had some college education or more was enrolled for at least one year in post-secondary education.\(^{42}\) Note that \( \psi_1 \approx \psi_2 \), meaning that tastes for college need only differ slightly to generate the degree of college persistence observed in the data. So college in our model will be mainly due to selection, and we will see later that college plays little role in explaining life-cycle inequality.

Let \( M_e \) denote the vector of the 27 empirical moments. We find the point estimate \( \hat{\Theta} \) by numerically solving

\[
\hat{\Theta} = \arg \min_\Theta [M(\Theta) - M_s]' [M(\Theta) - M_s],
\]

where \( M(\Theta) \) are the simulated model moments.\(^{43}\) Note that this is a large nested fixed point problem, since for every \( \Theta \) we must also satisfy the two equilibrium and one budget balance conditions in Definition 1. Furthermore, taxation, subsidies and college costs are parameterized as fractions of mean earnings, so there is an additional fixed point in which we must ensure that \( \bar{e} \) equals 1. Numerical details are given in Appendix B.2.

4.3 Model fit

Performance of the model can be seen in Tables 6 and 8. We attain a near exact fit for all the average moments, in particular the three intergenerational moments, and also the time profile of parents’ time spent with children. The age profiles of the college earnings premia

\(^{42}\)This number is the same whether we condition on biological or residential fathers, but slightly lower at 69% for both biological and residential mothers. Since our earnings data is from heads of households in the PSID, of which more than 90% are the husband, we chose the number conditional on fathers. The average enrollment rate in NLSY97 is approximately 49%, slightly higher than the 45% in the PSID.

\(^{43}\)We weight all average moments in Table 6 equally, but give Table 8 smaller weights.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Mean Earnings</th>
<th>Col. Premia</th>
<th>SD(log e_j)*</th>
<th>Time wt Child**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data  Model</td>
<td>Data  Model</td>
<td>Data  Model</td>
<td>Data  Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.59  0.23</td>
<td>1.15  1.30</td>
<td>0.47  0.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.75  0.46</td>
<td>1.30  1.56</td>
<td>0.51  0.44</td>
<td>0.16  0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.86  0.59</td>
<td>1.48  1.66</td>
<td>0.53  0.44</td>
<td>0.10  0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.93  0.69</td>
<td>1.63  1.69</td>
<td>0.56  0.54</td>
<td>0.08  0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.99  0.85</td>
<td>1.69  1.74</td>
<td>0.59  0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.00  1.00</td>
<td>1.87  1.95</td>
<td>0.65  0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.89  0.99</td>
<td>2.09  1.86</td>
<td>0.69  0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Residual standard deviation after controlling for college; in the data, also for time effects
** Average of active time spent with children by both parents

Table 8: Data and Calibrated Moments by Age
Mean earnings in period 9 (ages 54-60) are normalized to 1, both in the data and model. In the model, children of adults in periods 5-7 are in periods 0-2, or age 0 to 17.

and log-earnings variances are close to the data, which one might expect given the similarity of the adulthood part of the model to Heckman et al. (1998); Huggett et al. (2011). However, the mean earnings profile is steeper than in the data.

While the PSID earnings profiles are estimated from adults who work, in reality many children are taken care of more intensively by a parent who does not work. But in our model, the single parent needs to both work and spend time with the child. This makes his measured earnings when young lower than in the data, when he spends more time with the child than at work. In related vein, the model implies slightly lower inequality in periods 5-7, and higher inequality later in life. Since all parents spend more time with children and less at work, inequality is suppressed when young; as adults make up for the lost time by working more later in life, inequality becomes larger.

This effect can also be seen in the age profiles of adulthood human capital and own time investments in Figure 8. The shapes of these profiles are not unusual, but own time investments, especially in periods 5-7, are somewhat lower than in standard models, especially for high school. Adults invest more in themselves even as they invest in their children. Because they know their working time is reduced when young, they invest more in themselves when young to reap higher earnings when they are older and children have left the household. So both because human capital grows more rapidly and also because they work less when young, the age profile is steeper than in the data.

Nonetheless, we match the mean and variance of lifetime earnings and time investments in children almost exactly, giving us confidence in how we formulated the connection between children’s human capital \( \tilde{h} \) to adulthood human capital \( h \) in (5). Moreover, most of our subsequent analysis will be based on lifetime earnings, so the age-earnings profile plays only a minor role.

25
5. Sources of Inequality

There are two important departures our paper makes from earlier works: initial conditions themselves are a product of investments from parents at earlier ages, and subsequent life-cycle earnings vary not only because of shocks to one’s own human capital but also through future decisions made based on their (unborn) children’s learning abilities.

5.1 Adulthood Inequality

Similarly as in Huggett et al. (2011), we first decompose how much of lifetime outcomes can be explained by differences at age 24. The individual states at this age are \((S, a, h, s_4)\): whether or not an individual went to college, one’s learning ability and human capital accumulated up to this age, and wealth transfers received from one’s now elderly parent. The outcome variables we consider are lifetime earnings \((LFE)\), defined as the present-discounted sum of earnings at all ages up to retirement, and lifetime wealth \((LFW)\), which is simply lifetime earnings plus the initial transfer received from the parent.\(^{44}\)

To compute the contribution of initial conditions, we first divide individuals into three equally sized groups, separately for each state \((a, h, s)\). We then compute the fraction of lifetime earnings and wealth variance that can be attributed to various combinations of these initial conditions by computing conditional variances.

The variance of lifetime earnings and wealth explained by initial conditions are sizable in our model, at 73-74\% (column 1). So despite life-cycle uncertainty (the human capital shocks and future investment in children), a large portion of individuals’ lifetime outcomes can be explained by initial conditions when they become independent.\(^{45}\) But conditional

\(^{44}\)That is, \(LFE = \sum_{j=4}^{10} e_j/(1 + r)^j - 4 \) and \(LFW = LFE + s_4\).

\(^{45}\)This number is close to Huggett et al. (2011), who compute this number as ranging from 61-67\%. In Keane and Wolpin (1997), as much as 91\% of lifetime utility differences are explained by initial conditions.
Variance explained by (%): (S,a,h₄,s₄) (a,h₄,s₄) (S,h₄,s₄) (S,a,s₄) (S,a,h₄)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LFE</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFW</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Variance conditional on individual state at age 24-29

LFE and LFW stand for, respectively, lifetime earnings and lifetime wealth, defined in footnote 44.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Corr. wt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>log a</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log h₄</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.36 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log s₄*</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>-0.09 0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log s₄ &gt; 0</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>-0.09 0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Moments of initial distribution at age 24

log s₄* is computed by adding machine zero to s₄ to avoid taking logs of zeros. The row log s₄ > 0 shows the statistics when excluding zeros. Less than 0.02% of parents make zero transfers.

The variance of learning abilities and human capital at age 24 is much larger, and their correlation smaller, than in Huggett et al. (2011), in which the initial distribution is exogenously calibrated. This is due to our inclusion of childhood human capital formation. A large variation in h₄ is required to explain lifetime inequality, but in order to arrive at this level the model requires enough variation in learning abilities, which is the only exogenous source of heterogeneity before labor market entry. This also results in a higher correlation between ability and h₄.

Interestingly, s₄ is negatively correlated with learning abilities, and only weakly positively correlated with h₄. This suggests a compensatory mechanism that we investigate further in

As they note, this does not mean that inequality is exogenously predetermined, since we assume forward looking, individually rational individuals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Compared to group:</th>
<th>Change in $LFE$ percentile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College $S$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning ability $a$</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-18.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>24.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human capital $h_4$</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-20.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>23.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers $s_4$</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>-2.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Average Lifetime Earnings Differences Across Groups

The first row shows the lifetime earnings rank difference between college and high school workers, holding all else equal. The following rows show the average differences between the high and low groups compared to the medium group, holding all else equal.

The next section: parents with high learning ability children invest more in their human capital and transfer less financial assets, especially among poorer parents.

Table 9, while useful, does not tell us the exact contribution of each state variable at age 24 since they are intercorrelated. In particular, learning abilities seem to play a large role, but some of it is because the other variables are outcomes of investments made by parents who take into consideration their children’s ability. To analyze the importance of each separately, we first compute the lifetime earnings of high school individuals ($S = 0$) whose $(a, h_4, s_4)$ are in the median group. We then compute the lifetime earnings percentile difference between this group and other groups which only differ in terms of one state variable. The results are shown in Table 11.

The college effect is small and negative: Holding all else equal, going to college moves individuals along the lifetime earnings percentile down by 6.38 percentage points. In our model, the college premium is generated by positive selection on tastes for college, so the controlled effect is negative due to the opportunity cost of attendance. Both learning abilities and human capital play a large role. Having higher ability or human capital moves individuals up the lifetime earnings rank by more than 20 percentage points. The effect of having lower ability or human capital are similar, moving individuals down by 18-23 percentage points. Financial transfers have a small but non-monotonic effect: both smaller and larger transfers reduce lifetime earnings. Below we will find that this is not due to parental effects, but because children themselves later invest in their own children (the grandchildren). Individuals with large assets invest more in their children than themselves, increasing their children’s human capital at the expense of their own.

5.2 Children’s outcomes

Given the important of the distribution at age 24, we now decompose how much is due to an individual’s own learning ability or due to one’s parental background. We follow a similar exercise as above. We take a parent’s state at age 30 (when the child is born) as the initial
condition, and decompose how much of the child’s ability can explain the child’s outcomes: his lifetime earnings and wealth, and initial human capital and assets \((h_4', s_4')\). The results are summarized in Table 12.

By construction, the child’s \((S', h_4', s_4')\) is a function of the parents \((S, a, h_5, s_5)\) and the child’s ability \(a'\). So the contribution of the parent’s state at age 30 (when the child is born) relative to the child’s initial conditions is only imperfect due to the shocks the parent receives while raising the child. Just like an individual’s human capital shocks later in life has little explanatory power for lifetime inequality, it also turns out that the parents’ shocks have little explanatory power for children’s outcomes as well. As seen in column (1) of Table 12, parents’ states at age 30 explain virtually as much as the the children’s own states when they become independent.

So parental states at age 30 explain most of their children’s outcomes, almost as much as the children’s initial conditions at age 24. Our model allows us to extend this further to even before the child is born: we can analyze how much of children’s outcomes are affected by parental states at age 24, and even by the grandparents’ states at age 24. These results are summarized in columns 2-3 of Table 12.

Parents’ states have stronger explanatory power for children’s lifetime wealth than earnings differences. Even before a child is born (when parents are age 24), parents’ states can explain 49% of children’s lifetime wealth, but only 22% of their earnings (column 2). Young parents with high ability children are unable to invest enough in their human capital due to life-cycle borrowing constraints, but these same children can quickly accumulate human capital as an adult. This makes earnings depend less on parents. In contrast, children’s lifetime wealth are more affected by parents because \(s_4'\) is decided later in life when life-cycle constraints matter less.

The reason parents’ states have such large explanatory power can be see in the third and fourth rows. Parents’ states before the child is born explains a large amount of children’s eventual human capital and asset levels at age 24, meaning that parents with higher states both invest more in their children and also transfer more assets. Of course, this is because the model postulates that the investment parents make in children, both in terms of human capital and financial assets, are not only functions of the children’s states but the parents’ states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance explained</th>
<th>(1) ((S, a, h_5, s_5, a'))</th>
<th>(2) ((S, a, h_4, s_4))</th>
<th>(3) ((S, a, h_4, s_4)_g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>children (LFE')</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children (LFW')</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children (h_4')</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children (s_4')</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Variance conditional on intergenerational states

\(LFE'\) and \(LFW'\) stand for, respectively, the children’s future lifetime earnings and lifetime wealth, defined in footnote 44. \((h_4', s_4')\) are the children’s initial endogenous states when they become age 24-29 (become independent). Column 1 conditions on the parents’ states at age 30-35; Children are aged 0-5 at this stage. Columns 2-3 conditions on the parents’ and grandparents’ states, respectively, when they are aged 24-29.
Parent’s $a$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Med.</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child’s $a'$: Med.</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Fraction of parent’s lifetime wealth transferred to child

For each group, we compute $s'_4/(1+r)^5LFW$, where $s'_4$ is discounted to parent’s age 24 and $LFW$ refers to the parent’s lifetime wealth, also measured at age 24.

The grandparents’ contribution to explaining grand-children’s lifetime earnings and age 24 human capital inequality is still high compared to the parents’. This is due to the assumed mean reversion in learning abilities. Although uncertainty of future offspring’s learning abilities matter from one generation to the next, this effect is washed out within two generations. On the other hand, because financial transfers are used to compensate for ability differences, without knowledge of the learning abilities of the next two generations, the grandparent generation’s conditions when young lose explanatory power for wealth differences (through $s_4$) for the grandchild generation.

To see this more clearly, in Table 13 we tabulate how much of parents’ lifetime wealth are transferred to the next generation by nine groups of families, divided by whether the parent and child’s learning ability is low, medium or high. Clearly, high ability parents transfer more of their wealth to their children. However, note that they also pass down less to high ability children, in anticipation of their higher earnings later in life. There is a compensation mechanism in place: because childhood investment and transfer decisions are made after observing their children’s abilities, when a parent realizes that a child’s ability is higher (lower) than expected, she can compensate for this by leaving less (more) assets and investing more (less) in his education.

6. Comparison to Becker-Tomes

To illustrate the importance of our multi-period model, we compare it against the following simple 2-generation model. A parent has at his disposable $(1-\tau)h+s$, where $h$ corresponds to his lifetime earnings and $s$ a transfer he received from a grandparent. The parameter $\tau$ is a flat tax rate that we will calibrate to equal the average tax rate in the benchmark model. He must allocate his net resources to his own consumption $c$, investment in his child’s human capital $x$, and financial transfers $s'$:

$$\max_{c,c',x,s'} \left\{ u(c) + \hat{\theta}u'(c') \right\} \quad \text{subject to} \quad (25a)$$

$$c + \frac{s'}{(1+r)^5} = (1-\tau)(h-x) + s, \quad c' = (1-\tau)h' + s', \quad (25b)$$

$$h_k = \tilde{\zeta}a'(x+\tilde{d})^\gamma, \quad s' \geq 0 \quad (25c)$$

where $u(\cdot)$ is CRRA, $c'$ is the consumption of the child, and $\hat{\theta}$ the degree of altruism. Children’s human capital, $h'$, is produced through $(25c)$, with productivity $\tilde{\zeta}$ and decreasing
returns, $\bar{\gamma} < 1$. The learning ability of the child, $a'$, is heterogeneous across the population and correlated with $a$. Investment in children is subsidized by a lump-sum government transfer $\bar{d}$. We will assume that the transfer is taken as given by the parents, but that the government ensures that it equals a fraction $\pi_d$ of their average earnings. When the child grows up, he can consume $(1 - \tau)h'$, which captures his lifetime earnings, plus any financial transfers received from his parents that accrue interest, $r_{BT} = (1 + r)^5 - 1$. Intergenerational transfers are subject to a non-negativity constraint.

This is a standard version of the BT model ubiquitously employed in the literature. Some features of this model are:

BT1: When the constraint $s \geq 0$ is not binding, the optimal choice for $x$ is to equalize the returns to investment to the gross interest rate $1 + r_{BT}$.

BT2: If no households are subject to the borrowing constraint, the stationary IGE of earnings is equal to the persistence of abilities, $\rho_a$.\(^{48}\)

BT3: If all households are subject to the borrowing constraint, the stationary IGE of earnings is equal to $\frac{\rho_a + \bar{\gamma}}{1 + \rho_a \bar{\gamma}}$ if $u(c) = \log c$.

BT2-BT3 imply that if the economic behavior of households is to add anything to a mechanical approach in terms of explaining intergenerational persistence, the intergenerational borrowing constraint must play a large role. However, Mulligan (1999) finds that the IGE’s of constrained and unconstrained households barely differ, casting doubt on the relevance of intergenerational human capital investments.

In our model, dynamic complementarity across investments in children creates a role for borrowing constraints faced by young parents to alter child outcomes. Thus, we are able to downplay the significance of the intergenerational borrowing constraint faced by old parents, which was the only market incompleteness in BT. Consequently, our model is able to remain empirically consistent while still attributing a significant role to economic mechanisms in terms of explaining intergenerational persistence.

### 6.1 Implied IGE’s

To operationalize the comparison, we first fix the distribution of parents’ $(h, s)$ to equal the distribution of parents earnings and savings at age 24 in the benchmark model. When doing so, we assume that $h$ is the present discounted sum of all future earnings, but before investment in children. Then we compute the one-generation ahead decisions of the BT model. We will call this the “short-run” model. From the short-run model, we calibrate the returns and productivity of investments $(\bar{\gamma}, \bar{\zeta})$, and altruism $(\bar{\theta})$, so that the average level of investments, children’s lifetime earnings and intergenerational transfers received in the BT model is equal to their levels in our benchmark model. The calibrated parameters

\(^{49}\)In this simple setup, the wage per unit of human capital is normalized to 1, or can be assumed to be subsumed in $\bar{\zeta}$. To make the BT model as similar to our benchmark model as possible, we deduct education expenses $x$ from taxable earnings.

\(^{47}\)See Appendix C for derivations.

\(^{48}\)Under stationarity, the IGE=IGC.
Figure 9: Rank Correlation between Children’s Earnings and Transfers Received
For the benchmark model, the figure plots the rank correlation between average earnings and $s_4$. Parents' net wealth in the benchmark model are defined as the present value of discounted income, net of tax and transfers, plus their wealth in period 4 (age 24). For the BT model, the figure plots the rank correlation between $(h', s')$, and parents’ net wealth is $(1 - \tau)h + s$. “BT Short” and “BT Long” are the one-generation ahead and steady state outcomes. See text for description of the BT model.

are tabulated in Appendix Table 15. All other parameters are held fixed, in particular the intergenerational process for learning abilities, (3).

We then compute the steady state of the BT model, assuming that each successive generation faces the same decision problem but with an updated distribution of $(h, s)$. We will call this the “long-run” model. The distributions of $(h', s')$, and the resulting IGE, in both the short- and long-run BT models are compared against our model.\footnote{Since we are comparing a single human capital outcome of the child $(h')$ in the BT model to the lifetime earnings of children, it may be of concern that we are comparing different objects. However, we have already seen that lifetime inequality is determined early on, so that earnings ranks do not change much over the life-cycle. Appendix Figure 18 shows that the rank correlation between children’s lifetime earnings and their human capital, $h'_j$, is high and stable for all $j'$, at around 0.85. Consequently, the rank correlation of $h'_j$ with parents’ lifetime earnings is also quite stable throughout their lifetimes, at around 0.5.}

According to BT1, in the BT model, unconstrained parents invest in their children up to point where the returns equal the interest rate. So among parents with a similar amount of resources, there will be a compensation mechanism: those with high $a'$ children will invest more in children’s human capital $(h')$ and transfer less $(s')$, and vice versa for those with low $a'$ children. Hence, if more parents are unconstrained, the more negative will be the conditional correlation between $(h', s')$ in the children’s generation.

As we see in Figure 9, when families are split into 10 groups according to the level of parents’ net wealth, both the short- and long-run BT models result in a negative rank correlation of around -0.7 across net wealth deciles. But in the benchmark model, the rank correlation between children’s average earnings and transfers, $s_4$, is close to zero. As shown in the first row of Table 14, these patterns also bear out in aggregate. The correlation between earnings and transfers is -0.40 in the BT model, but 0.05 in our model. While data on intergenerational transfers are limited to inheritance data, which is very noisy, the PSID and HRS suggest the negative correlation by the BT model is unlikely.\footnote{Available evidence shows a highly skewed inheritance distribution with a large fraction of families leaving
Table 14: Comparison across Benchmark and BT models

"BT Short" and "BT Long" are the one-generation ahead and steady state outcomes. See text for description of the BT model. In the top panel, the first row shows the rank correlation between children's earnings and transfers received. The IGE of wealth is conditional on both the parent and child having positive wealth. The bottom panel shows the IGE of lifetime earnings for households in which parents make transfers below the level of average (annualized) earnings, $\bar{e}$, in each model. Wealth in the benchmark model is measured as $\sum_{j=4}^{12} s_j$. The last row shows the model-implied fraction of such households.

always the children of poor parents who have the largest correlation, meaning they are the least likely to achieve efficient investment in children.

In the short-run BT model, this still results in a realistic level of an IGE, as shown in the second row of Table 14. But in the long-run model, as many of the poor households escape the constraint (lower deciles in Figure 9), the IGE falls to an unrealistic level of 0.23. According to BT2 and BT3, this means that the borrowing constraint barely matters in aggregate, and the IGE more or less follows ability persistence ($\rho_a = 0.23$). As shown in the fourth row of Table 14, many households make larger transfers in the long-run.

So in our model, the IGE of earnings does not simply reflect the correlation of abilities (Goldberger, 1989), nor is much explained by the intergenerational borrowing constraint (Becker and Tomes, 1986). Rather, it is the life-cycle borrowing constraints faced by parents, coupled with dynamic complementarities across multiple periods of investment in children, that generates a sizable part of the IGE of earnings (Heckman and Mosso, 2014). In similar vein, the IGE of wealth is at an unrealistically high level of 0.62 in the BT model, since more parents transfer wealth to their children rather than educating them. In our model it is 0.41, close to the the empirical estimate of 0.37 in Charles and Hurst (2003).

very little bequests Hurd and Smith (2003); De Nardi and Yang (2014).

51Mulligan (1999) reports only about 12% of households expecting bequests above $25,000 in 1982 dollars, which is around the mean earnings in his PSID sample. In the HRS, 43% of respondents respond affirmatively to the question on whether they “expect to leave a sizable inheritance.” The AHEAD survey elicits the subjective probability of leaving any bequests, of which the sample average is 0.55.

52While their estimate is based on children’s wealth before receiving bequests and hence not directly comparable, it is close to our benchmark model where we measure wealth as the average level of savings ($s_j$) across all periods $j = 5, \ldots, 10$. Hurd and Smith (2003) also present evidence that much of wealth is not bequeathed, so a large level of intergenerational persistence is unlikely.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>BT Short</th>
<th>BT Long</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corr($LFE, s_4$) or Corr($h, s$)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGE of earnings</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGE of wealth</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr(IG transfer $\leq \bar{e}$)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG transfer $\leq \bar{e}$</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG transfer $&gt; \bar{e}$</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33
Figure 10: Parents’ Intergenerational Transfer Decisions
For each period $j$, the Figure (a) plots the rank correlation between parents’ $h_j$ and children’s initial human capital and assets, $(h_4, s_4)$. Figure (b) plots average of intergenerational transfers by parents’ net wealth decile. Parents’ net wealth in the benchmark model are defined as the present value of discounted income, net of tax and transfers, plus their wealth in period 4 (age 24). For the BT model, parents’ net wealth is $(1 - \tau)h + s$. “BT Long” is steady state outcomes. See text for description of the BT model.

### 6.2 Constrained vs. Unconstrained Households

In the last two rows of Table 14, we split households according to whether parents leave transfers above or below the mean wage, similarly as in Mulligan (1999). As implied by BT2-BT3, the IGE is higher among constrained households for both BT models, although in the long-run, the difference becomes less prominent as some poor households escape the constraint. However, Mulligan (1999) finds no evidence for such a difference in the PSID sample, concluding the BT model cannot matter much for the IGE. In fact, he finds suggestive evidence that the IGE is higher among unconstrained households.

In our model, the IGE is in fact similar between the two groups, and slightly larger for unconstrained households. In our model, whether or not a parent is bound by the intergenerational borrowing constraint says little about the IGE. First, when young parents realize they cannot invest in their children, they instead increase their own human capital to leave more transfers later. Conversely, this means that young parents who invest more in their children invest less in themselves. This is shown in Figure 10(a): the rank correlation between parents’ $h_j$ and the transfer they leave, $s'_4$, increases with their age $j$, while the correlation with children’s initial human capital, $h_4$, declines.

Second, this dissociates children’s earnings and wealth, which was also seen in Table 10 in the previous section. That is, there are children with high earnings but low wealth, and vice versa, generating much more heterogeneity in the cross-sectional distribution of earnings and wealth. In our steady state, there are many parents with high net wealth but low ability, and low net wealth but high ability, as shown in Figure 10(b). Consequently, many high net wealth parents are wealthy not because of high earnings but high wealth passed down from previous generations, and vice versa, as shown in Figure 11(a). Although it is still the case that high net wealth parents transfer more wealth to their children, the association is much
looser than in the BT model, as shown in Figure 11(b). In contrast, the BT model results in strong sorting in the steady state, so all wealth-rich parents are also earnings-rich parents.

In our model, wealth-rich parents are much more similar to each other than in the standard BT model. Consequently, the IGE’s also look more similar across different groups. So rather than concluding that borrowing constraints don’t matter and that abilities and/or preferences may be more important for explaining intergenerational persistence, our results point toward the importance of borrowing constraints that matter earlier in life coupled with dynamic complementarity in childhood investments.

7. Counterfactuals

Given the importance of borrowing constraints for childhood investments and intergenerational persistence, we focus on 7 counterfactuals. The first three involve relaxing the borrowing constraints faced by parents, and the rest are policy experiments with respect to taxation and education subsidies.

7.1 Market Incompleteness

Parents in our model face two types of borrowing constraints: the life-cycle constraint (8), which applies to all periods in life, and the intergenerational constraint (11), which prevents parents from borrowing against their children’s future income. In particular, our previous results suggest that life-cycle constraints do not explain much of life-cycle inequality, but is important because it affects how parents invest in children. And since investment in children are completed by the time they make their intergenerational transfer decisions, the intergenerational constraint had less bite.
Three policy experiments: relaxing the intergenerational borrowing constraint, the life-cycle borrowing constraint, and both. The short-run result is one generation after implementing the policy change. “PE Long-run” is when the economy reaches a new steady state, but prices (interest rate and wages) are still fixed at their initial levels. “GE Long-run” is the new steady state equilibrium.

To investigate these channels, we first compute a counterfactual in which we relax the intergenerational borrowing constraint to $-g/(1 + r)$, so that it is equal to the life-cycle borrowing constraint. Then, we instead relax the life-cycle borrowing constraint to $-2g/(1 + r)$. Lastly, we relax both constraints.

For each of these counterfactual scenarios, we focus on three measures of children’s outcomes: the variance of (residual) log earnings, average level of earnings, and the resulting IGC. In Figure 12, we show the results under different timing assumptions:

1. a short-run PE: a one-generation ahead transition, with no change in prices. Parents start period 4 at the same states as in the benchmark stationary equilibrium, but now face the new borrowing constraints.

2. a long-run PE: the stationary distribution, but still with no change in prices

3. a long-run GE: the new stationary equilibrium with new prices.

As expected, relaxing the intergenerational constraint alone has only small effects. Inequality rises as measured by the variance of (residual) log earnings, while intergenerational persistence falls in the long-run. There is barely any change to average earnings. Relaxing the life-cycle constraint has qualitatively different effects from relaxing the intergenerational constraint when doing so, we must also double the lump-sum subsidy to guarantee that agents can repay their debt in all realized states.

The results are also tabulated in Appendix Table 16.
one. Inequality rises in the short-run, while mobility increases. But in the long-run, inequality also drops while persistence drops even further.

In both cases, inequality rises because constrained parents tend to be those with higher ability. So investment in children becomes more efficient, and persistence drops. But when life-cycle constraints are relaxed, even poorer parents are able to take advantage of the dynamically complementary technology in the long-run, so earnings become more equal while persistence continues to drop. This is consistent with the previous subsection in which the borrowing constraints faced by young parents when they also need to invest in their children could explain a large fraction of intergenerational persistence in the long-run. But as parents allocate more resources toward their children and less to market labor, average earnings drop.

Qualitatively, it is unclear what would happen when both constraints are relaxed. The outcome is a purely quantitative one that depends on the calibrated parameters. It turns out that persistence is lower in the long-run when both constraints are relaxed simultaneously, but not as much when they are relaxed separately. But keep in mind that the earnings difference between high and low individuals are much smaller, since earnings become much more equal. Moreover, average earnings also rise, since instead of sacrificing market labor, parents are able to pull some of their children’s future resources toward the children’s education.

7.2 Government policies

In this subsection we implement 4 counterfactual policies: eliminating the progressivity of income taxation in (23), and focusing all education subsidies \((d_0, d_1, d_2)\) into only one of the three periods of childhood. We label these policies “FT,” “P0,” “P1” and “P2,” respectively. As in the previous section, for all 4 policies, we consider a short- and long-run PE, in addition to the long-run GE. The resulting variance of (residual) log earnings, average level of earnings, and IGC of the children’s generation are depicted in Figure 13.\(^{55}\)

First consider the flattening of the income tax schedule. We assume that the tax rate is equal the average tax rate in the benchmark calibration (about 24%). Of course, we are not carefully modeling top incomes, for whom tax progressivity matters the most. Nonetheless, our results show that while there is little change in the variance of earnings, there is a significant improvement in intergenerational mobility (the IGC drops from 0.37 to 0.29), associated with a small rise in average earnings (about 3 percentage points). The rise in earnings is expected, since individuals accumulate more human capital when less of their earnings are taxed away. Parents invest more in their children for similar reasons, which affects intergenerational persistence.

But flattening the tax schedule has a negligible effect compared to the education subsidies. While there is no change in the absolute amount of education subsidies across the benchmark calibration and the P0, P1, P2 counterfactuals, the effects are large and differ significantly in the short-run. In the long-run, all policies generate large drops in the IGC, while lowering inequality and increasing average earnings.

In the long-run, P0 lowers the IGC the most, to about 0.1, along with a 21 percentage point increase in average earnings. P1 lowers the IGC to about 0.15, while raising average

\(^{55}\)The results are also tabulated in Appendix Table 16.
earnings by about 11 percentage points. Since the long-run (residual) earnings variances are similar, there is a sense in which earlier subsidies improve both mobility and efficiency.

Interestingly, P0 is the only policy which has little short-run impact. Broadly speaking, focusing education subsidies shift private investment into the other periods.\textsuperscript{56} But how much this matters for intergenerational persistence also depends on the distribution of parental states. In the short-run, high human capital parents benefit more from the earliest subsidy: Even though it is better to subsidize education early on under dynamic complementarity, low human capital parents cannot invest the additionally required amount in their children in later periods. In contrast, later subsidies serve as an “equalizer”: The optimal levels of investment are lowered for all parents due to the absence of the early subsidy, and the later subsidies boost the human capital levels of children of low human capital parents.

But as the change in policy becomes anticipated (for the first generation of parents, it is unanticipated), the human capital of young parents become higher (that is, they enter adulthood with higher levels of human capital). This makes early investments even more important and later investment less important over time. In particular, as prices adjust, the larger supply of human capital reduces the stock of physical capital, driving up the equilibrium interest rate.\textsuperscript{57} This makes it costlier to borrow against future income to invest in children, further raising the importance of early subsidies.

Education subsidies are attractive in the sense of lowering inequality and raising average

\textsuperscript{56}As shown in Appendix Figure 19, flat taxes barely shift parents’ investment compared to the benchmark.
\textsuperscript{57}Last column in Appendix Table 16.
earnings. Early subsidies may not have a visible impact on mobility in the short-run, while later subsidies can. But in the long-run, early subsidies can have the largest effect on mobility, especially in general equilibrium: i) the earliest stage of investment is the most important when the childhood human capital accumulation displays dynamic complementarity, and ii) it is also when parents are the most financially constrained. Moreover, this is associated with a long-run rise in average earnings, as more human capital is accumulated in the economy.

In Appendix D, we perform robustness checks when the change in the size of subsidies is smaller, and also when the degree of complementarity across investment in children is smaller. Overall, the magnitude of the results are smaller but qualitatively consistent.

8. Conclusion

We presented a model of human capital that incorporates both life-cycle and intergenerational components. Parents invest in their children over multiple periods and also decide on financial transfers. Consistent with prior work, we assume complementarity between early and later investments in children, and consider both time and goods investments. We also model the college enrollment decision, and model life-cycle wage growth via investment in one’s own human capital. We cast this environment in an equilibrium setting with various government policies. Most importantly, individuals face life-cycle borrowing constraints, preventing them from achieving optimal investment in young children, which are difficult to correct later in life.

We find that parental states can explain as much as half of children’s lifetime wealth inequality and a quarter of lifetime earnings inequality. Dynamic complementarity in investments in children coupled with life-cycle borrowing constraints account for as much as a third of intergenerational persistence, while intergenerational borrowing constraints matter less. Consequently, whether or not a parent transferred financial assets to their children contains little information on whether he achieved efficient investment in children. Lastly, we find evidence suggesting that early education subsidies are the most effective tool with which to reduce intergenerational persistence, while taxation plays only a small role. While more work needs to be done, our model has the potential to account for US-Europe differences in inequality and mobility by assigning a first-order role to policy differences.
Appendices

A. Data

For all moments, we use the sampling weights published in the PSID and/or CDS.

A.1 PSID family files

For individuals over 30, we keep only those years in which they work 520 hours or more and earn 1500 dollars or more, and for those 30 and below, only those those who work 260 hours or more and earn 1000 dollars or more (in 1968 prices). We also drop all observations in which an individual works more than 5820 hours per year. Top-coded earnings are multiplied by 1.5, which is a common ad-hoc correction procedure (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2006).

All earnings are then inflated to 2000 dollars using the GDP PCE deflator, after which we smooth individual earnings profiles using a 5-year moving average. Lastly, we only keep all heads of households aged 20 and above, and 65 and below. We do not differentiate between genders. This leaves us with 31,486 earnings observations from 1,981 heads of households.

A.2 PSID-CDS

Data Cleaning The CDS contains information on primary and secondary caregivers, who may or may not be a parent, and also may or may not be in the child’s household. We merge information on adults in the CDS into the PSID using household and individual identifiers, and only keep those children who live with at least one biological parent, and for whom both caregivers in the CDS correspond to the head or wife in a PSID family unit. More than 90% of primary caregivers are biological mothers. We keep single parents as long as they are the primary caregiver. Then we use the same criteria as in Appendix A.1 and drop observations if parents’ earnings are too low, or hours too low or high. We also drop families in which a parent is less than 18 or more than 42 years older than the child. This leaves us with 4,402 observations over the 3 waves of the CDS.

Time Diaries Following Del Boca et al. (2014), we first aggregate the time each parent spent with a child, resulting in 8 categories (2 parents×2 days×(active,passive)). When doing so, we adjust weekday hours so that average hours spent in each category is equal across children of the same age. Weekend hours are similarly adjusted. Specifically, for each category, adjustments are made to raw data following:

\[
l_i(\text{Adj. Day}) = l_i(\text{Raw Day}) \times \frac{\bar{l}(\text{Mon-Fri})}{\bar{l}(\text{Day})}
\]

\[
l_i(\text{Adj. Sat}) = l_i(\text{Raw Sat}) \times \frac{\bar{l}(\text{Sun})}{\bar{l}(\text{Sat})}
\]

\[
l_i(\text{Adj. Sun}) = l_i(\text{Raw Sun}) \times \frac{\bar{l}(\text{Sat})}{\bar{l}(\text{Sun})}
\]

where \(l_i\) is an individual observation, “Days” run from Monday through Friday, and \(\bar{l}(X)\) denotes the average hours spent per day during X. For this normalization, we use the raw CDS data before merging with the PSID. There are a total of 6,915 non-missing observations.
over the 3 waves. While we use CDS-provided sampling weights to compute means, they are first adjusted so that the sum of weights within a wave is equal.

We then compute weekly hours spent with children for moms and dads, and their average, by multiplying weekday hours by 5 and weekend hours by 2 and then adding them. The mean values by children’s age are plotted in Figure 14 in Appendix E. As expected, moms spend more time with children than dads. It is also not surprising that active time spent with children declines with age. However, passive time spent with children does not seem to follow a particular trend, although it seems moms tend to spend less and dads more time as their children age. Despite differences in sample selection criteria—they focus only on one- or two-child families in which both biological parents are present, and further analyze children and one- and two-child families separately—all these features are similar to results in Del Boca et al. (2014).

To compute the parents’ opportunity costs of time, we obtain the hourly wage rate for each parent by dividing parents’ earnings by annual hours. By multiplying these rates by parents’ weekly time spent with children, we compute the annual cost of time investments, separately for active and passive time. The results are shown in Figure 3 in the main text.

**Money Investments** Money investments in children are extremely noisy in the CDS. Only about 10% of the sample has reliable expenditure data on the costs of childcare, and among children above age 5, only about half of the parents report expenses on extracurricular activities. Moreover, since most childcare is irregular, the survey asks for at least 4 types of childcare arrangements, and for each type, the amount of money spent, how frequently the cost is incurred and how long the arrangement was used. There is also data on special arrangements, such as during weekends or summers. We drop all observations if no costs were incurred or we are unable to transform the costs into annual dollars. For extracurricular activities, we only include those that are at least indirectly related to education, such as tutoring or participation in community programs.58

In the 1997 CDS, administrators of the daycare center or school the child was attending were also asked questions such as how many students the institution had by age (for daycare centers) or by grade (for schools), the average amount of dollars spent per child/student, and average fees charged to parents. Using this information, we construct average dollars spent per child for each age, by averaging over the mean dollars spent and fees charged by all institutions weighted by the number of children they report having in each age/grade and the CDS sampling weights. This assumes that the distribution of schooling costs is similar to the distribution of children.

---

58While the final, reliable number of observations is small, the amount of available data is sparse but large, requiring an immense amount of cleaning. More details on how we construct the money expenditure data are available upon request.
B. Numerical Details

B.1 Relative Skill Prices and Labor Market Clearing

Let \( L_0 \equiv 1 - L_1 \) denote the employment share of high school workers. Using (14), we can write the college earnings premium as

\[
EP = \frac{w_1}{w_0} = \frac{H_1}{H_0} \frac{L_0}{L_1} \Rightarrow \frac{H_1}{H_0} = \left( \frac{1 - \nu}{1 - \nu} \cdot \frac{L_1}{L_0} \cdot EP \right)^\frac{1}{\sigma}
\]

and plugging this back into (14) we obtain

\[
\frac{w_1}{w_0} = \left( \frac{1 - \nu}{\nu} \right)^\frac{1}{\sigma} \left( \frac{L_1}{L_0} \cdot EP \right)^\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}.
\]

Next, in a stationary equilibrium, the aggregate wage index in (14) must satisfy

\[
W \equiv (1 - \alpha) \left[ \frac{\alpha}{(1 + \bar{r} + \delta)^6 - 1} \right]^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}}
\]

and since \((\alpha, \delta, \bar{r})\) are parameters, \(W\) also becomes a parameter. But then from (15),

\[
w_0 = W \cdot \left[ \nu^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \nu)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}(w_1/w_0)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{1 - \sigma}{\sigma}}.
\]

The empirical values of \(EP\) and \((L_0, L_1)\) in (26) are observed in the data (Table 1), so if we know \(\nu\), (27) determines \((w_0, w_1)\) separately. Hence, we calibrate \(\nu\) so that the model implied high school employment share is equal to its empirical value in equilibrium. Later, other parameters are calibrated so that the model implied college premium is equal to its empirical counterpart, which implies labor market clearing.

B.2 Implementation

**Numerical grids** For each stage of the life-cycle, we set a square-grid on the continuous state variables \((h_j, \tilde{h}_j', s_j)\). When solving for optimal policies, we linearly interpolate over next period’s value functions. The AR(1) process for abilities are approximated using the Rouwenhorst method in Kopecky and Suen (2010), and i.i.d. grids for the luck shocks \(\epsilon_j\) using the equal-mass approach in Kennan (2006).

**Value functions** Except for the first period of an individual’s working life, in which there are 2 choice variables, all periods involve solving for 3 choice variables for each grid point on the state space. Furthermore, all of these choices involve bound constraints that are potentially binding. We optimize over the objective function in each period using a simplified version of Kim, Sra, and Dhillon (2010), which is a projected quasi-Newton method with subsequent BFGS updates modified to check for boundary constraints. Given a guess \(V^n_4\), we can solve all for all value functions \(V_9, V_8, \ldots\) by backward induction, obtaining a new guess \(V^{n+1}_4\) (\(V_0\) is deterministic and not subject to the dynastic continuation values). We iterate until \(|V^{n+1}_4 - V^n_4|\) falls below a specified tolerance criterion.
Equilibrium and SMM For a given guess of the parameter vector \( \hat{\Theta} \), we obtain individual decision rules, the stationary distribution, and find \((\beta, \upsilon, A)\) that matches \( \bar{r} = 4\% \), the share of high school workers in (26), and a mean earnings of \( \bar{e} = 1 \). We obtain the stationary distribution via Monte-Carlo simulation by simulating \( N = 120,000 \) households for \( T = 200 \) generations using the optimal decision rules computed above. Given the simulated moments, we solve (24) using a Nelder-Meade downhill simplex routine. The choice of \((N, T)\) is arbitrary, but increasing to \( N = 240,000, T = 300 \) had negligible effects.

Further details are available upon request.\(^{59}\)

C. Proof of Claims BT1-BT3

BT1: The first order conditions for program (25) are:

\[
\begin{align*}
\ell' : \quad & u'(c)/\bar{\theta}u'(c') \geq 1 + r_{BT} \quad \text{with equality if } s > 0 \\
x' : \quad & u'(c)/\bar{\theta}u'(c') = \gamma \bar{\zeta} a'/(x + \bar{d})^{1-\gamma}
\end{align*}
\]

(28)

hence when \( s > 0 \), the parent simply equates the marginal investment of \( x \) to the gross interest rate \( 1 + \bar{r} \), as claimed in BT1.

BT2: When the constraint does not bind, clearly

\[
x^* + \bar{d} = \left( \frac{\gamma \bar{\zeta} a'}{1 + r_{BT}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \log h' = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \cdot \log \left( \frac{\gamma \bar{\zeta} a'}{(x + \bar{d})^{1-\gamma}} \right).
\]

Hence if no households are constrained, the IGE of \( h' \) is simply equal to the IGE of \( a' \). So under stationarity, the IGE of earnings, as measured by \( \bar{w}h \), is \( \rho_a \) (IGE=IGC).

BT3: Conversely, if the constraint binds for all households, and utility is log, the optimal choice of \( x \) simply solves (28):

\[
\begin{align*}
\bar{\zeta} a'(x + \bar{d})^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}/(h - x) &= \gamma \bar{\theta} \bar{\zeta} a'/(x + \bar{d})^{1-\gamma} \\
\Rightarrow x^* &= \frac{\gamma \bar{\theta} h - \bar{d}}{1 + \gamma \bar{\theta}} = \frac{[\gamma \bar{\theta} - \pi_d]}{1 + \gamma \bar{\theta}} h \\
\Rightarrow \log h' &= \left[ \log \bar{\zeta} + \gamma \log \left( \frac{\bar{\theta} \gamma (1 + \pi_d)}{1 + \bar{\theta} \gamma} \right) \right] + \frac{\gamma \bar{\theta}}{1 + \bar{\theta} \gamma} h + \log a'.
\end{align*}
\]

So assuming stationarity and subtracting \( \rho_a \log h \) from both sides yields

\[
\log h' - \rho_a \log h = (1 - \rho_a) \left[ \log \bar{\zeta} + \gamma \log \left( \frac{\bar{\theta} \gamma (1 + \pi_d)}{1 + \bar{\theta} \gamma} \right) \right] + \mu_a - \sigma_a^2/2
\]

\(^{59}\)Many compromises were made to make the numerical problem manageable. For example, we do not use policy function iteration due to the number of choice variables, nor use directly approximate the distribution due to the size of the state space.
\[ + \gamma \log h - \rho_a \bar{\gamma} \log h_{-1} + \eta \]
\[\Rightarrow \log h' = B + (\rho_a + \bar{\gamma}) \log h - \rho_a \bar{\gamma} \log h_{-1} + \eta \] (29)

where \( h_{-1} \) is the human capital of the grandparent, and \( B \) is a constant. The regression coefficient of \( \log h' \) on \( \log h \), which is the implied IGE, is easily solved for following Ch. 20 in Greene (2011). Since

\[ \text{IGE} \overset{p}{\rightarrow} \frac{\text{Cov}(\log h, \log h')}{\text{Var}(\log h)}, \]

under stationarity, we can simply take the covariance of both sides of (29) with \( \log h \), resulting in BT3.

**D. Robustness**

**D.1 Size of Education Subsidies**

In the benchmark policy experiments above where we altered the size of the subsidies, the effects may be exaggerated since the counterfactual scenario we are considering is a rather large one—two of three subsidies are eliminated altogether, and all resources are focused into one period.\(^{60}\)

To check whether the size of the subsidies make a qualitative difference, we conduct a similar experiment but with smaller magnitudes: for each period P0, P1, and P2, we increase the size of the subsidy only by 10%. At the same time, we decrease the size of the other two subsidies proportionately, so that the total amount of subsidies remains the same. The results are presented in Figure 20.

Comparing Figures 13 and 20, while the qualitative effects are similar as in the previous subsection, the effect of the policy changes are much smaller, as expected.\(^{61}\) In all cases, there are virtually no effect on average earnings, both in the short- and long-runs. And as before, the P0 has the largest effect on the IGC in the long-run GE, decreasing it by about 3 percentage points, while the other two policies have only a minimal effect of about 1 percentage point. However, now this is associated with a small increase in inequality as measured by the residual log earnings variance, although the rise is negligible.

As already noted above, an important take-away is that the effect of these subsidies are again very different in the short- and long-runs. For example, for P0, the IGC in fact *rises* in the short-run and long-run PE, implying that high human capital parents benefit disproportionately more than low-human capital parents, who cannot match their private investments to the increase in public subsidies.

**D.2 The Role of Complementarity**

While borrowing constraints are important for our results, their quantitative effects depend on the dynamic complementarity between periods, as measured by the parameters \((\phi_1, \phi_2)\).

\(^{60}\)We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out and recommending this exercise.

\(^{61}\)Figure 21 shows that in all cases, parental time investments do not change much in the long-run GE.
Our benchmark values of $\phi_1 = \phi_2 = 0$ implies a Cobb-Douglas technology across the 3 periods of investment, while these parameters were separately estimated from the data in Section 3 (and visually represented in Figure 17).

To see how important model moments respond to these two critical parameters, we conduct 4 sets of additional exercises in which we decrease the degree of substitutability. The results are presented in Figures 22-25. In the first three figures, $\phi_1$ or $\phi_2$, or both, are set to 0.5, implying a elasticity of substitution of 2; in the last figure, both are set to 1, implying perfect substitution across all periods. In addition to the counterfactual moments that result from the change in parameters, we also conduct the same education subsidies experiments as in Section 7.2. That is, given the change in parameters, we also compute the results from focusing all education subsidies into one of the three periods of investment.

Let us first focus only on the change in parameters (without considering the subsequent policy experiments). In all cases, there is a slight increase in the residual log earnings variance, and a rise in average earnings—especially when both parameters are changed simultaneously, and the effect is largest when $\phi_1 = \phi_2 = 1$. Overall, as investment in children across time periods become less complementary (and more substitutable), it becomes easier for parents to alleviate suboptimal investments from one period by investing more in another period when possible, so average earnings rise. But clearly this effect will be disproportionately beneficial for rich parents, since poor parents may have no resources to shift anyway. This leads to a rise in inequality.

The counterfactual IGC’s drop in all cases. Comparing Figures 22-24, it is apparent that the effect of a larger $\phi_1$, or when the first and second period investments become more substitutable, has the largest effect on the IGC. This implies that a significant amount of intergenerational persistence can be explained by dynamic complementarity, especially between the two earlier periods in life. That is, if we were to fix $\phi_1$ to a larger value, we would need a larger value for the persistence of innate ability in order to explain the degree of intergenerational persistence observed in the data. Hence, complementarity and financial constraints faced by the parents when children are young are important for explaining intergenerational persistence (Heckman and Mosso, 2014).

But note that when both $\phi$’s are set to 1, the change in the IGC is negligible. This can be understood from the larger rise in inequality and average earnings. In this case, children of rich parents become disproportionately better off compared to children of poor parents, so changing ranks over generations becomes more difficult, suppressing the effect that less complementarity could have on reducing intergenerational persistence.\footnote{Note that even with perfect substitution, all parents still face the period-to-period borrowing constraints, so the model still does not collapse to a simple version of the Becker-Tomes model in which only one investment is made subject to one borrowing constraint.}

On a final note, when we conduct the education subsidies experiments using the different set of parameters, the effects are qualitatively similar to the benchmark results in Section 7.2 except when both $\phi$’s are set to 1; however, the size of the effects are much smaller. This should be expected, since with less complementarity, constraints will matter less. The effect is the smallest when $\phi_1 = 0.5$, which is also expected since we have already found that complementarity is the most important between periods 1 and 2. Interestingly, note that the effects are somewhat different when both $\phi$’s are set to 1: in this case, since investments across
periods are perfectly substitutable subject only to period-to-period borrowing constraints, all three policies tend to have more similar effects, especially in the long-run.

E. Additional Figures and Tables

(a) Active Time

(b) Passive Time

Figure 14: Time investment in children
Source: PSID, Child Development Supplement Time Diaries. “Active” time is defined as when children report a parent participated in their activity, and “passive” time when they report a parent was around but not participating.
Figure 15: Letter-Word Test Question Difficulties
Source: PSID, Child Development Supplement. For each question, we compute the fraction of children who answer correctly, regardless of age. We use the CDS provided sampling weights, normalized so that the sum of weights in each of the 3 waves are equal.

Figure 16: Childhood Skill Production Estimates: $\phi_0$
Source: PSID, Child Development Supplement. Refer to text for the dependent and independent variables used for the regression in the right panel.
Figure 17: Childhood Skill Production Estimates: $\phi_j$

Source: PSID, Child Development Supplement.

Figure 18: Average Earnings and Human Capital

For each age interval $j'$, the top and bottom lines plot the rank correlation of human capital at age $j'$ with children’s own lifetime earnings, and with their parents’ lifetime earnings, respectively.
Figure 19: Policy Experiments, Time with Children
Four policy experiments: eliminating tax progressivity ("Flat Tax"), and giving all education subsidies only for children in their first, second or third periods of education (ages 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17, respectively, labeled "P0," "P1" and "P2"). The figure plots the mean time spent with children for each stage in childhood in the new steady state equilibrium.

Figure 20: Small Subsidy Experiment
Three policy experiments: increasing education subsidies by 10%, only for children in their first, second or third periods of education (ages 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17, respectively, labeled “P0,” “P1” and “P2”). The short-run result is one generation after implementing the policy change. “PE Long-run” is when the economy reaches a new steady state, but prices (interest rate and wages) are still fixed at their initial levels. “GE Long-run” is the new steady state equilibrium.
Figure 21: Small Subsidy Experiment, Time with Children

Three policy experiments: increasing education subsidies by 10%, only for children in their first, second or third periods of education (ages 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17, respectively, labeled “P0,” “P1” and “P2”). The figure plots the mean time spent with children for each stage in childhood in the new steady state equilibrium.

Figure 22: Policy Experiments with φ₁ = 0.5

Counterfactual moments when φ₁ = 0.5, and three policy experiments: giving all education subsidies only for children in their first, second or third periods of education (ages 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17, respectively, labeled “P0,” “P1” and “P2”). The short-run result is one generation after implementing the policy change. “PE Long-run” is when the economy reaches a new steady state, but prices (interest rate and wages) are still fixed at their initial levels. “GE Long-run” is the new steady state equilibrium.
Counterfactual moments when \( \phi_2 = 0.5 \), and three policy experiments: giving all education subsidies only for children in their first, second or third periods of education (ages 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17, respectively, labeled “P0,” “P1” and “P2”). The short-run result is one generation after implementing the policy change. “PE Long-run” is when the economy reaches a new steady state, but prices (interest rate and wages) are still fixed at their initial levels. “GE Long-run” is the new steady state equilibrium.

Counterfactual moments when \( \phi_1 = \phi_2 = 0.5 \), and three policy experiments: giving all education subsidies only for children in their first, second or third periods of education (ages 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17, respectively, labeled “P0,” “P1” and “P2”). The short-run result is one generation after implementing the policy change. “PE Long-run” is when the economy reaches a new steady state, but prices (interest rate and wages) are still fixed at their initial levels. “GE Long-run” is the new steady state equilibrium.
Counterfactual moments when $\phi_1 = \phi_2 = 1$, and three policy experiments: giving all education subsidies only for children in their first, second or third periods of education (ages 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17, respectively, labeled “P0,” “P1” and “P2”). The short-run result is one generation after implementing the policy change. “PE Long-run” is when the economy reaches a new steady state, but prices (interest rate and wages) are still fixed at their initial levels. “GE Long-run” is the new steady state equilibrium.
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<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>BT</th>
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<td>$\zeta$</td>
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<td>$\theta$</td>
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Table 15: Calibrated Parameters for BT model
BT stands for the version of Becker and Tomes (1986) employed in the text. In the text, we differentiated the parameters by putting bars over them in the BT model.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>GE Long-run</th>
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<td>IGC Var  (\bar{E})</td>
<td>IGC Var  (\bar{E})</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.32 0.33 1.06</td>
<td>0.32 0.31 1.05</td>
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<td>Flat Tax</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.24 0.28 1.11</td>
<td>0.17 0.31 1.11</td>
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Table 16: Relaxing Borrowing Constraints
Seven experiments. Top panel: relaxing the intergenerational borrowing constraint, the life-cycle borrowing constraint, and both. Bottom panel: flattening the tax function, and focusing all education subsidies in period 0, 1, or 2. The short-run result is the IGC and average earnings one generation after implementing the policy change. “PE Long-run” is when the economy reaches a new steady state, but prices (interest rate and wages) are still fixed at their initial steady state levels. “GE Long-run” is the new steady state equilibrium. The last column is the new equilibrium interest rate in the long-run GE.
References


